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1193 
MERCY IN AMERICAN LAW: 
THE PROMISE OF THE ADOPTION OF THE OUTLOOK OF 
JEWISH LAW 
 
Yehiel Kaplan * 
ABSTRACT 
Under Jewish law, mercy and compassion are essential 
principles to ensure the presence of a just legal system.  Not only do 
mercy and compassion in the law preserve traditional values of human 
dignity, implementing a more compassionate legal system has 
practical benefits in both the spheres of legal judgment and of legal 
punishment.  This article will compare the Jewish legal system’s 
application of these necessary doctrines to how other modern legal 
systems, including the American legal system, implement mercy and 
compassion.  As a result of this in-depth comparison, this article 
recommends that the American legal system, and other modern legal 
systems, should borrow from the Jewish legal system in order to place 
a greater importance on mercy by focusing more on rehabilitation of 
the offender rather than demanding strict adherence to harsh 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
American law has granted less weight to mercy and 
compassion and more weight to the strict path of “get-tough” 
punishment and correctional policies.1  When these policies were 
adopted, they were not necessitated by concerns of deterrence.2  They 
were also problematic from a constitutional standpoint, since the 
Eighth Amendment prohibited cruel and unusual punishment.3  
However, the Supreme Court of the United States interpreted this 
Amendment in a manner that limited the implementation of mercy in 
 
1  See Angela J. Thielo et al., Rehabilitation in a Red State: Public Support for 
Correctional Reform in Texas, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 137, 137-38 (2015) 
(concerning the adoption of the get-tough correctional policy in the state of Texas). 
2  See David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat 
Offenders, 110 YALE L.J. 733, 769-70 (2001) (“[P]eculiarly severe punishments are 
reserved for offenders who have been caught committing one offense right after 
another.  This pattern suggests, once again, that something other than deterrence 
concerns – or more precisely, optimal-deterrence concerns – are driving our 
sanctions practices.”). 
3 The foundation for the interpretation of the words “cruel and unusual” can be found 
in the United States Supreme Court decision of Weems v. United States.  217 U.S. 
349 (1910).  In this case, the Court decided that ‘“[t]he punishment of fifteen years’ 
imprisonment was a cruel and unusual punishment, and, to the extent of the sentence, 
the judgment below should be reversed on this ground.”  Id. at 359.  The Court 
explained: 
[T]he highest punishment possible for a crime which may cause the loss 
of many thousands of dollars, and to prevent which the duty of the State 
should be as eager as to prevent the perversion of truth in a public 
document, is not greater than that which may be imposed for falsifying a 
single item of a public account. And this contrast shows more than 
different exercises of legislative judgment. It is greater than that. It 
condemns the sentence in this case as cruel and unusual. It exhibits a 
difference between unrestrained power and that which is exercised under 
the spirit of constitutional limitations formed to establish justice. The 
State thereby suffers nothing and loses no power. The purpose of 
punishment is fulfilled, crime is repressed by penalties of just, not 
tormenting, severity, its repetition is prevented, and hope is given for the 
reformation of the criminal. 
. . . . 
[E]ven if the minimum penalty of cadena temporal had been imposed, it 
would have been repugnant to the bill of rights. In other words, the fault 
is in the law, and, as we are pointed to no other under which a sentence 
can be imposed, the judgment must be reversed, with directions to dismiss 
the proceedings. 
Id. at 381-82. 
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the American legal system.  According to this interpretation, it 
contained no proportionality guarantee in the sphere of criminal-
sentencing.4  This decision was a deviation from the policy in the prior 
decision of this Court in which the ban upon cruel and unusual 
punishment included a prohibition upon the implementation of a 
disproportionate punishment.5  According to the perspective of the 
Supreme Court, the Constitution prevents the legislature from 
authorizing particular forms or modes of punishment and, specifically, 
cruel methods.6  However, it also ruled that when capital punishment 
was not involved, there was no mercy requirement.7  Outside of the 
capital punishment context, this requirement was not necessary, due to 
the qualitative difference between death and all other penalties.8 
There were attempts to limit the negative effects of the policy 
of strict punishments.  Public support for correctional reform was 
evident even in conservative states in the United States, such as Texas.9  
There was a shift to mercy and compassion, in certain aspects, in laws 
of certain states or rulings in case-law.10  However, the basic 
 
4 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 963 (1991).  In Harmelin, the Court held 
that this punishment, while severe, might be cruel but is “not unusual in the 
constitutional sense” since it has “been employed in various forms throughout” the 
history of the American nation.  Id. at 994-95.  In Harmelin, the accused received a 
life sentence without the possibility of parole for possessing 672 grams of cocaine.  
Id. at 961. 
5 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983), overruled by Harmelin, 501 U. S. 
957. 
6  See Solem, 463 U.S. at 284.  In this case the Supreme Court held that a prison 
punishment, a life sentence without parole, was cruel and unusual.  The relevant 
standard was the “gravity of the offence and the harshness of the penalty.”  The 
Eighth Amendment prohibits this disproportionate punishment, given the crime. 
7 See Harmelin, 501 U. S. at n.4 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 
305 (1976)). 
8 Id. 
9 See Thielo et al., supra note 1, at 137. 
10  The merciful policy was adopted in the Penry cases.  In Penry v. Lynaugh, the 
Supreme Court held that Mr. Penry had been sentenced to death in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment as a result of the fact that Texas’ special instruction questions 
did not permit the jury to consider mitigating evidence involving his mental 
retardation.  See 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).  In Penry v. Johnson, the Supreme Court 
ruled that the judgment of the lower court was reversed in part because the jury 
instructions failed to adequately instruct the jury regarding mitigating evidence.  See 
532 U.S. 782, 787 (2001). 
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foundations of the American legal system in the sphere of judgment of 
suspects and punishment of criminals did not change.11 
Adoption of this strict punishment policy is not desirable.  
There are many advantages to a legal system adopting a more human 
perspective, as is evident in Jewish law, and considering mercy as an 
essential element on the path leading to justice.12 
Mercy is required in the sphere of legal judgment.  The harsh 
perspectives of judges and juries who convict and impose severe 
punishments, and sometimes do not consider the possibility of more 
merciful alternatives, are undesirable.  When the facts and evidence do 
not lead to one unquestionable conclusion and legal tribunals convict 
and do not attribute due weight to the benefit of doubt, injustice may 
ensue.  Harsh punishment policies, including imposition of the most 
severe punishment (i.e., the death penalty) in unjustified 
circumstances, or the imposition of punishments in a disproportionate 
and excessive manner,13 are especially undesirable when the decision 
to convict the accused might not be justified.  Many unfortunate 
mistakes of the legal system can be avoided or reduced when mercy 
and kindness are important considerations and are granted the required 
due weight.  Controversial, strict, and severe judgments and 
punishments can erode societal trust in the just outcome of the 
proceedings in the legal system.  This undermining of public trust is a 
problematic outcome because “[w]ithout trust, our modern systems of 
government, commerce, and society itself would crumble.”14 
Mercy is important in the sphere of punishment as well.  The 
goal of the crime prevention system is the reduction of the crime rate 
and deterrence of criminals.  However, laws and policies of courts 
designed to deter crime by focusing mainly on increasing the severity 
of punishment are ineffective, partly because deterrence is the 
 
11 See Martin H. Pritkin, Fine-Labor: The Symbiosis Between Monetary and Work 
Sanctions, 81 COLO. L. REV. 343, 389 (2010).  In 2010, the general trend in American 
law was an insistence upon strict and severe punishment.  Id. 
12 See Robert L. Minser, A Strategy for Mercy, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1318-
30 (2000) (concerning the advantages of adopting a more human perspective). 
13  See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (concerning proportionality in 
punishment in the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States).  In this case, 
the Court held that the death penalty for rape of an adult woman was grossly 
disproportionate and excessive punishment, and therefore unconstitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Id. 
14  Neil Richards &Woodrow Hertzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 433 (2016). 
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behavioral response to the perception of sanction threats.  However, 
the conclusion that crime decisions are affected by sanction risk 
perceptions is not sufficient to conclude that policy can deter crime.15  
Severe punishments do not achieve this goal, and many times after a 
long time served in prison, convicted criminals revert to their criminal 
habits.  The implementation of severe punitive measures has not 
reduced the crime rate in the United States.  Research findings have 
shown that criminal recidivism was not reduced as a result of the shift 
from mercy to a stricter punishment policy in the United States.16  In 
addition, the psychological benefits of mercy and compassion, when 
they are justified in light of the circumstances, are evident in human 
behavior.17  Harsh punishments, especially when they are not justified, 
do not enhance positive human behavior.18  The shift from a greater 
emphasis upon offender rehabilitation to a greater emphasis upon 
punishment of offenders has not borne good fruit.  The result has been 
an expansion of the correctional system and an increase in the rate of 
 
15 See Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 
199, 204 (2013). 
16 See Daniel P. Mears et al., Recidivism and Time Served in Prison, 106 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 81, 83-123 (2016). 
17 See id. at 93. 
18 See Adrian Grounds, Psychological Consequences of Wrongful Conviction and 
Imprisonment, 46 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 165 (2004) 
(concerning the psychological damage as a result of unjustified and unnecessary 
convictions of criminals); see also Adrian T. Grounds, Understanding the Effects of 
Wrongful Imprisonment, 32 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2005); Seri Irazola et al., Study of 
Victim Experiences of Wrongful Convictions, IFC INC. 20-51 (Nov. 2013). 
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incarceration in the United States.19  This reality has imposed a 
financial strain upon the public budget in the United States.20 
The main focus of this article is upon the presentation of the 
better alternative.  This desirable outlook is evident in many Jewish 
sources.  In Jewish law (Mishpat Ivri), mercy and compassion are 
essential and complement strict legal doctrines.  By the essential 
integration of strict legal norms and mercy, a Jewish judge may arrive 
at the “ultimately true” verdict (din emet la-amitto).21  Additionally, 
implementing mercy in law is essential because Jewish texts require a 
significant implementation of Jewish values – especially mercy and 
compassion – in Jewish law.  These texts further require a legal 
mechanism that focuses on the maintenance and dignity of human 
beings, who are created in God’s image. 
I will explain how the Jewish legal system attempts to 
implement these basic foundations of Judaism, in an appropriate 
manner, in judging suspects and sentencing criminals after their 
conviction.  I will also suggest that this approach should inspire 
modern legal systems, including the American legal system.  Jewish 
law has a much more comprehensive and demanding outlook 
concerning the significance of mercy in the legal system.  The 
American legal system would do well to adopt the kinder and more 
generous outlook of Jewish law and grant greater weight to the 
significance of mercy, compassion, and mitigating circumstances in its 
legal system.  This shift in the American legal system should include 
 
19 See ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON 
STUD. 1 (8th ed. 2009); see also Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative 
State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1333 (2008) (regarding the 
failure of the policy of severe punishment, was that these are “punitive, unforgiving 
times”).  In her article, Barkow offered explanations for several facts.  In 2008, she 
wrote there were: 
more than two million people behind bars in the United States. Over five 
million people [were] on probation or some other form of supervised 
release. Prisoners [were] serving ever-longer sentences. Presidential and 
gubernatorial grants of clemency [were] rare events. The use of jury 
nullifications to check harsh or overbroad laws was viewed by judges and 
other legal elites with suspicion. 
Id.; see also Michael Welch, Ironies of American Imprisonment, in HANDBOOK ON 
PRISONS 359 (Yvonne Jewkes et al., eds., 2d ed. 2016). 
20 See United States v. Simmons, 375 F. Supp. 3d 379, 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). 
21 See discussion infra Part III(A) (concerning the ultimate truth in Jewish law). 
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a return to emphasis upon the rehabilitation of offenders.22  The 
outcome of this policy should be positive for all members of society.23 
Indeed, there are scholars who claim that the emphasis upon 
mercy in punishment, including the perspective presented in the 
Jewish texts, is incompatible with the concept of retributive justice and 
the principle of equality in law.  They claim that the implementation 
of mercy in the legal system can lead to dangerous offenders, who are 
morally accountable, escaping appropriate punishment.24  They are 
also opposed to granting significance, in criminal law, to certain 
circumstances that might justify the mitigation of the punishment in 
courts, such as the prisoner’s age or the suffering of his or her family.25  
They claim certain factors that the legal system defines as mitigating 
factors – such as the offender’s belief that he or she was acting in 
justified circumstances, including justified civil disobedience – are 
irrelevant to the penal process and an obstacle for a legal system when 
it attempts to achieve the goal of retribution in an effective manner.26  
However, Kathleen Dean Moore, who justifies the institution of 
pardons based on a retributive conception of justice, nevertheless 
claims that the legal system should grant pardons not only for false 
convictions and convictions of the insane.27  It should also grant 
 
22 See John Steer & Paula K. Biderman, Impact of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
on the President’s Power to Commute Sentences, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 154, 156 
(2001) (“A post-sentencing development that historically has provided a basis for 
altering the punishment imposed is recognition of extraordinary defendant initiatives 
that convincingly demonstrate rehabilitation.  Today, however, a defendant’s 
opportunity to shorten a prison sentence through post-sentence rehabilitative conduct 
is quite limited.  With its abolition of parole, restrictions on post-sentence motions 
for a reduced sentence under Rule 35, and tight limits on good-time credits to reduce 
the term of imprisonment required to be served, the [Sentencing Reform Act] clearly 
shifted from a rehabilitation philosophy (insofar as a purpose of imprisonment) to an 
approach emphasizing certainty of punishment and other sentencing purposes.”). 
23  See Hannah Fuetsch, The Progressive Programming Facility: A Rehabilitative, 
Cost-Effective Solution to California’s Prison Problem, 48 U. PAC. L. REV. 449, 449-
63 (2017) (concerning the benefits of rehabilitation for criminals and all members of 
society). 
24 See Daniel Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1453-73 (2004). 
25 Id. at 1436. 
26 See id. at 1443 n.70. 
27 See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST 97-98 (1989); see also Robert Weisberg, Apology, Legislation, and Mercy, 
82 N.C. L. REV. 1415, 1421-23 (2004) (concerning the positive effect of mercy in 
capital punishment cases). 
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pardons to reduce the sentences of criminals who were treated too 
harshly.  According to her, a policy that grants due weight to mercy 
for good and sufficient reasons should be part of the path leading to 
true justice in the legal system.28 
Several aspects of adopting an approach that favors mercy in 
the Jewish legal system, especially the significance of mercy in the 
Bible and in the writing of prominent rabbis in ancient times, the 
medieval period, and the twentieth century, are presented in this 
article.29  Additionally, interpretations of many sources pertaining to 
mercy in Jewish law are presented.  There is also a focus upon the 
gradual development of Jewish law pertaining to the significance of 
mercy.  The message broadcast by these Jewish sources, whereby 
mercy has an essential role in the legal system, will be emphasized.  
The article presents a comprehensive outlook that stems from a 
number of important Jewish sources pertaining to mercy.  The legal 
principles in these texts, and their interpretation and analysis, are 
applicable in many spheres of Jewish law.  They lead one modern 
Israeli legal scholar to the conclusion that “Jewish law is 
comprehensive . . . ‘It includes also charity, morality, compromise, 
education, and in this legal system, compromise is more dominant than 
strict law and the activity beyond the strict latter of law is 
preferable.’”30 
II. MAJOR TRENDS IN AMERICAN LAW 
One approach in American criminal law is to grant less weight 
to mercy and a lenient judgment, while giving greater weight to a strict 
 
28 Id. 
29 Many new sources and aspects of mercy in Judaism are presented in this article.  
There are also other presentations regarding the significance of mercy in Jewish law 
in English.  See Samuel J. Levine, Looking Beyond the Mercy/Justice Dichotomy: 
Reflections on the Complementary Roles of Mercy and Justice in Jewish Law and 
Tradition, 45 J. CATH. LEG. STUD. 455, 455-71 (2006); see also Samuel J. Levine, 
Capital Punishment in Jewish Law and its Application to the American Legal 
System: A Conceptual Overview, 29 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1037, 1037-53 (1998) 
(presenting the outlook in certain sources in Jewish law pertaining to capital 
punishment); Daniel A. Rudolph, The Misguided Reliance in American 
Jurisprudence on Jewish Law to Support the Moral Legitimacy of Capital 
Punishment, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 437, 437-62 (1996). 
30  Ariel Rosen-Zvi, Tarbut Shel Mishpat - Al Meoravut Shiputit, Akhifat Hok ve-
Hatma’at Arakhim, 17 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 689, 692-93 (1993). 
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legal policy and severe punishments.  I will focus upon the effect of 
this approach in two spheres in American law: the policy pertaining to 
three-strikes laws and the policy pertaining to capital punishment. 
A. Three-Strikes Laws 
Between 1993 and 1997, twenty-six states and the Federal 
Government enacted three-strikes laws.31  California adopted a three-
strikes law, reflecting a shift in its sentencing policies regarding the 
incapacitation and deterrence of repeat offenders.  The California 
three-strikes law was an attempt “to increase the prison terms of repeat 
felons.”32  Under the three-strikes law there was a “go-tough” policy, 
even concerning defendants serving a life sentence, at the stage in 
which they become eligible for parole.33  The purpose of this 
legislation was “to ensure longer prison sentences and greater 
punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously 
convicted of serious and/or violent felony offences.”34 
The three-strikes laws were controversial.  Critics doubted the 
wisdom of these laws, their cost-efficiency and their effectiveness, and 
claimed they do not achieve the goals of the law enforcement system 
in the United States.35  In addition, the Eighth Amendment’s ban on 
the imposition of “cruel and unusual” punishment prohibits “excessive 
 
31 James Austin et al., Three Strikes and You’re Out: A Review of State Legislation, 
NAT. INST. JUST. 1 (Sept. 1997), 
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/181297.pdf. 
32 People v. Romero, 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996). 
33 Under the three-strikes law: 
[defendants] become eligible for parole on a date calculated by a reference 
to a “minimum term,” which is the greater of (a) three times the term 
otherwise provided for the current conviction, (b) 25 years, or (c) the term 
determined by the court pursuant to § 1170 for the underlying conviction, 
including any enhancements. 
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 16 (2003) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 
667(e)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (West 1999); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c)(2)(A)(i)-
(iii) (West Supp. 2002)). 
34 Id. at 47 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE. § 667(b) (West 1999)).  “California . . . [was] 
the second state to enact a three-strikes law.  In November 1993, the voters of 
Washington State approved . . . [a] three-strikes law.”  Id. at 16. 
35 See Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 395, 423 (1997); Brian P. Janiskee & Edward J. Erler, Crime, 
Punishment, and Romero: An Analysis of the Case Against California’s Three Strikes 
Law, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 43, 45-46 (2000). 
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sanctions.”36  Faithful to the requirements stemming from this 
Amendment, the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution directs 
judges to apply their best judgment in determining the proportionality 
of fines and other forms of punishment, including the imposition of a 
death sentence.37  However, the path of mercy was not adopted when 
the California Court of Appeals38 and the Supreme Court rejected 
Ewing’s claim that his sentence, under the three-strikes law of the state 
of California, was grossly disproportionate under the Eighth 
Amendment.39  The Supreme Court ruled that “[t]he Eighth 
Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual punishment, contains a 
‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital 
sentences.’”40  It also stressed that three-strikes laws achieve an 
important goal: they deter repeat offenders.41 
B. Capital Punishment 
Capital punishment is controversial, and its opponents claim it 
is cruel, inhumane, and degrading.42  In the United States, the methods 
of legal execution are cruel: death by electrocution, firing squad, lethal 
gas, hanging, and lethal injection.43  Moreover, this punishment is 
irreversible.  There is no option of correcting a mistake of the legal 
system after the execution.  The critics claim that the imposition of this 
punishment is a severe violation of human rights.  Specifically, the 
 
36 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002). 
37 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 
(1977); United States v. Bajakajian, 542 U.S. 321, 334-36 (1998). 
38 See People v. Ewing, No. B143745, 2001 WL 1840666, at *1, *4 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Apr. 25, 2001) (relying on Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980)). 
39 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003). 
40  Id. (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-97 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part)).  See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910); see 
also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1992) (concerning the application 
of the Eighth Amendment to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment). 
41 See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 27. 
42 Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845 (11th Cir. 1996) (concerning the action 
of the courts in the United States in an attempt to combat illegal cruel, inhumane, 
and degrading treatment of human beings); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 209 (S.D. 
Fla. 1993). 
43 See Kristina E. Beard, Five Under the Eighth: Methodology Review and the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 445, 460-65 (1997). 
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right to life is an important right, and imposition of this punishment is 
a violation of this right, sometimes unnecessarily.44 
Advocates of the death penalty claim it is necessary in order to 
combat crime in an effective manner, deterring potential criminals and 
ensuring that convicted criminals do not commit additional crimes.45  
However, the findings of one study, based upon analysis of 
international data, showed that there were declining murder rates after 
the abolition of the death penalty in certain countries.46  The death 
penalty abolition correlated on average with a decline in murder rates in 
eleven countries for which data was available.  Death penalty advocates’ 
fears that the state relinquishing the ultimate punishment will encourage 
potentially dangerous criminals to commit crimes, or at least weaken 
deterrence, have proven unfounded in light of this evidence.47  
Therefore, those opposed to the death penalty claim that there should 
be a total abolition of capital punishment in the United States.  They 
sometimes stress that it was abolished in Germany, Austria and Italy 
right after World War II.  Indeed, the European Union will not admit 
a country with a death penalty, since Article Two of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union prohibits the use of capital 
punishment.48  The Council of Europe, too, conditions membership, 
inter alia, upon abolition of the death penalty, and none of its member 
states has carried out an execution since 1997.  This pattern is 
dominant in Europe.49 
 
44 See N.B. Smith, The Death Penalty as an Unconstitutional Deprivation of Life and 
the Right to Privacy, 25 B.C. L. REV. 743, 745-46, 748-50 (1984); Kevin M. Barry, 
The Death Penalty and the Fundamental Right to Life, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1545, 1545-
1603 (2019). 
45 Moin A. Yahya, Deterring Roper’s Juveniles: Using a Law and Economics 
Approach to Show That the Logic of Roper Implies that Juveniles Require the Death 
Penalty More Than Adults, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 53, 53-106 (2006); Robert Blecker, 
Current Issues in Public Policy: But Did They Listen? The New Jersey Death 
Commission’s Exercise in Abolitionism: A Detailed Reply, 5 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 9, 20-21(2007). 
46 What Happens to Murder Rates when the Death Penalty is Scrapped? A Look at 
Eleven Countries Might Surprise You, ABDORRAHMAN BOROUMAND CTR. (Dec. 13, 
2018), https://www.iranrights.org/library/document/3501. 
47 Id. 
48 See 2000 J.O. (C 364) 9. 
49  See Peter Hodgkinson, The Twenty-Third Annual Law Review Symposium–The 
Ultimate Penalty: A Multifarious Look at Capital Punishment: Europe–A Death 
Penalty Free Zone: Commentary and Critique of Abolitionist Strategies, 26 OHIO 
N.U.L. REV. 529, 625-28 (2000). 
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In the United States, the death penalty has not been abolished, 
although its scope has been limited.  There was hope it might be 
abolished in 1972 when the Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia,50 
ruled that the Eighth Amendment imposed significant restraints on the 
imposition of the death penalty.51  It ruled that the death penalty, if not 
implemented in the appropriate manner, could be a violation of the 
prohibition in the U.S. Constitution.  The Court, in the majority 
opinion, declared that the “imposition and carrying out of the death 
penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”52  Thus the 
decision in that case effectively abolished the death penalty in the 
United States.53  For the first time in the history of the United States, 
there was an understanding, as a result of this decision, that it was 
illegal to execute a defendant.  The decision in the Furman case caused 
all death sentences pending at that time to be commuted to life 
imprisonment.54  It also forced the states and the U.S. Congress to 
rethink the rules in the state and federal statutes enabling the 
imposition of capital punishment, in an attempt to ensure that the death 
penalty would be administered in an appropriate manner.55  However, 
the ruling in Furman was concerned largely with the form in which the 
death penalty in the United States was carried out in certain cases, 
rather than with the substantive issue of whether this cruel and 
irreversible punishment was an appropriate method of punishment.  
The decision of the Court related to the lack of procedural safeguards 
and did not state that in all cases, this punishment was a violation of 
the rule in the U.S. Constitution. 
 
50 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
51 See id. at 239-40. 
52 Id. 
53 See Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death Sentence and 
Execution Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment? 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 147, 
152-53 n.15 (1998) (“Chief Justice Burger predicted privately that there would never 
be another execution in the United States” (quoting BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT 
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 259 (1979))). 
54 See Michael Mello, “In the Years When Murder Wore the Mask of Law”: Diary 
of A Capital Appeals Lawyer (1983-1986), 24 VT. L. REV. 583, 665 (2000). 
55  See Rory K. Little, Forward: The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some 
Thoughts About the Department of Justice’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 377-
78 (1999). 
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Later, in Gregg v. Georgia,56 the United States Supreme Court 
adopted a more accepting approach toward the implementation of the 
death penalty.  The Court described the two main features that were 
required in capital sentencing procedures in order to avoid cruel and 
unusual punishment as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.  
However, acceptance of imposition of the death penalty in the United 
States was reaffirmed: in particular, Mr. Gregg’s death sentence was 
upheld.57  The Supreme Court ruled that imposition of the death 
penalty in this case was not a violation of the rule in the Constitution 
so long as the procedures involved in the execution were not a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.58  This decision essentially ended 
Furman’s moratorium on the death penalty.  In the aftermath of the 
Gregg case, the death penalty was imposed frequently in the United 
States.59 
During this period, an approach affording weight to mercy was 
also sometimes evident in certain aspects pertaining to capital 
punishment, in state legislation in the United States or in case law.  The 
new outlook was especially evident in several rulings of the Supreme 
Court of the United States that limited the imposition of this 
punishment in certain spheres. 
The Supreme Court ruled that “a sentence of death was grossly 
disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape,” and 
therefore, in these circumstances, it was a “cruel and unusual” 
 
56 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
57 Id. at 154. 
58 Id. at 187. 
59 See, e.g., Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).  Utah was the first state that 
resumed the use of capital punishment after the 1967-1976 national moratorium on 
capital punishment, in 1977.  Gary Gilmore was  
[an] American murderer whose execution by the state of Utah in 1977 
ended a de facto nationwide moratorium on capital punishment that had 
lasted nearly 10 years. 
. . . . 
Gilmore’s death did not bring on an immediate wave of executions. By 
the end of 1982, only five more criminals – three of whom, like Gilmore, 
had voluntarily given up the appeal process – had been put to death. But 
the pace subsequently quickened: in the first 40 years after Gilmore’s 
death, 1,443 convicts were executed in the United States. 
See Robert Lewis, Gary Gilmore, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Jan. 13, 2021), 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Gary-Gilmore. 
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punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.60  The Court also 
held that the rule pertaining to a “cruel and unusual” punishment 
prohibited the imposition of the death penalty for the rape of a child in 
cases in which the victim did not die and death was not intended.61 
In another case, the Supreme Court ruled that capital 
punishment was not appropriate for a defendant who was a participant 
in a robbery in which his codefendant killed two victims.62  There was 
no evidence that the defendant either killed or intended to kill the 
victims, or that he intended that deadly force be used.  The Supreme 
Court stated that allowing capital punishment in these circumstances 
was a violation of the rule in the Eighth Amendment, and it reversed 
and remanded the defendant’s death sentence.63 
In other cases, the Supreme Court ruled, as a result of a 
merciful interpretation of the rules in the Constitution pertaining to 
harsh punishment, that capital punishment was not appropriate for 
criminals with developmental disabilities.  At the first stage, the 
Supreme Court ruled that execution of  criminals with developmental 
disabilities is not cruel and unusual punishment.64  However, in the 
Atkins case it ruled that the death penalty for criminals with 
developmental disabilities is cruel and unusual punishment which 
violates the  Eighth Amendment ban on such punishment.65 
Mercy is evident also in the context of the death penalty for 
juvenile murderers in the Thompson case.66  The merciful outlook in 
Thompson was expanded in the decision of the Supreme Court 
concerning death sentences for juveniles in the case of Roper v. 
Simmons,67 where the Court ruled that the Constitution prohibited the 
execution of juveniles who were under the age of eighteen when they 
committed a murder.68 
 
60 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).  “We have the abiding conviction 
that the death penalty, which ‘is unique in its severity and irrevocability’ . . . is an 
excessive penalty for the rapist.”  Id. at 598. 
61 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 412 (2008). 
62 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982). 
63 Id. 
64 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989). 
65 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002). 
66 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
67 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
68 See id. at 562. 
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The policy of merciful punishment for juvenile offenders was 
evident also in the sphere of the sentence of life without parole. At the 
first stage, the Supreme Court prohibited the sentence of life without 
parole for non-homicide juvenile offenders.69  Eventually it prohibited 
mandatory sentences to life without parole for juveniles, regardless of 
the crime they committed.70 
In addition, the Supreme Court removed limitations that had 
been imposed upon the presentation of mitigating evidence, or upon 
the best defense, in capital punishment cases.  In Lockett v. Ohio,71 the 
Court ruled that the death penalty statute was unconstitutional when a 
court imposed mandatory capital punishment based on three narrowly-
drawn mitigating factors, and did not permit individualized 
consideration of a wider range of mitigating circumstances.  The Court 
stated that the Constitution requires, in all but the rarest cases, that 
those who impose a sentence should consider all mitigating factors 
surrounding the accused before they reach the decision that the penalty 
should be death.72 
 In another case, a criminal was convicted and sentenced to 
death.  The Supreme Court ruled that the exclusion of evidence 
pertaining to the guilt of a third party in this case was unlawful.73  In a 
criminal trial, a conviction based on the strength of the prosecution’s 
case with little or no examination of the credibility of the prosecution’s 
witnesses or the reliability of its evidence violated the constitutional 
right of a criminal defendant to have a meaningful opportunity to 
present a defense.74  A court could not exclude evidence presented by 
a criminal defendant to the effect that a third party committed the crime 
simply because the prosecution had a strong case.75  In another capital 
punishment case, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the 
lower court, ruling that when the only aggravating factor was the 
particularly egregious (“outrageously or wantonly vile”) nature of the 
 
69 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
70 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
71 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
72 See id. at 604-05.  The issue facing the Supreme Court in the Lockett case was 
whether the Ohio death penalty scheme, where the jury could only consider three 
mitigating factors, violated Lockett’s Eighth Amendment protection against cruel 
and unusual punishment.  See id.  The Court ruled that it did.  Id. 
73 Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 331 (2006). 
74 See id. 
75 Id. at 330-31. 
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murder, the death sentence could not be imposed, since that factor did 
not help avoid arbitrary imposition of the death penalty on the part of 
judges or juries.76 
The Supreme Court also ruled that the aggravating factor 
necessary under Arizona law to impose a death sentence must be 
determined by a jury, not a judge.77  Since the death penalty was not 
possible without the finding of aggravating factors, a jury had to 
determine that those factors are present unless the defendant waives 
the right to a jury trial.78  The defendant should be able to exercise his 
right under the Sixth Amendment to benefit from the advantages of a 
jury trial.  A jury must evaluate all facts essential to the imposition of 
a death penalty, including aggravating sentencing factors, before 
rendering a decision as to whether the death sentence is appropriate.79  
This Amendment requires that the jury ascertain, in an independent 
act, the presence of the aggravating factors necessary for the 
imposition of the death penalty.  The Court determined that if a 
particular fact exposed the defendant to a greater punishment, the jury 
should find it.80 
The willingness to consider the adoption of the path of mercy 
concerning the implementation of capital punishment in the United 
States in a more significant manner was evident in the minority 
opinions of Jewish justices in the Supreme Court of the United States.  
In recent years, in his minority opinion in Glossip v. Gross,81 in which 
he was joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer focused upon the 
evidence that the administration of the death penalty in the United 
States was flawed and fraught with human risk.82  His dissenting 
opinion was an attempt to implement a mild form of mercy in capital 
punishment cases.  Although Justice Breyer did not reach the general 
conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty was a violation of 
the Constitution, he laid the foundation for this conclusion.  He noted 
that when the Supreme Court upheld the death penalty in 1976 in 
 
76 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 420 (1980). 
77 See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 592 (2002). 
78 Id. at 602. 
79 See id. at 611-13 (Scalia, J. & Thomas, J., concurring). 
80 Id. 
81 Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015). 
82 See id. at 908-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Gregg and accompanying decisions,83 it did so on the assumption that 
the statutes in the United States “contain safeguards sufficient to 
ensure that the penalty would be applied reliably . . . .”84  However, 
Justice Breyer stated that since then, circumstances have changed.85  
Administration of the death penalty at this time suffered from 
fundamental constitutional defects: 
(1) serious unreliability, (2) arbitrariness in application, 
and (3) unconscionably long delays that undermine the 
death penalty’s penological purpose. Perhaps as a 
result, (4) most places within the United States have 
abandoned” the use of capital punishment.86  This led 
to his conclusion that “those changes, taken together 
with my own 20 years of experience on this Court, lead 
me to believe that the death penalty, in and of itself, 
now likely constitutes a legally prohibited ‘cruel and 
unusual punishment.’”87 
The total shift towards mercy in this sphere – the abolishing of 
all forms of capital punishment – is not the general rule in the United 
States at present.  The decisions of the Supreme Court that displayed 
mercy were the outcome of the implementation of specific restrictions 
engendered by rules in the Constitution, especially the Eighth 
Amendment.  The interpretation of this Amendment led to the 
conclusion that “the death penalty is reserved only for the most 
culpable defendants committing the most serious offences.”88  
However, under this interpretation, the death penalty was not totally 
abolished.  In 2020, the United States is the only Western country at 
present that has the death penalty.89  Capital punishment is currently 
 
83 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247-
52 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 272 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331 (1976). 
84 Glossip, 576 U.S. at 908. 
85 See id. at 908-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
86 Id. at 909-10. 
87 Id. at 909. 
88 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 476 (2012). 
89 Death Penalty, AMNESTY INT’L (2021), https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-
do/death-penalty. 
17
Kaplan: Mercy in American Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center,
1210 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 37 
authorized in twenty-seven states, by the federal government and the 
U.S. military.90 
Ultimately, the Court ruled to prohibit the execution of 
mentally retarded and juvenile offenders in an attempt to comply with 
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.91  
However, this resulted in the Court adopting an alternative 
punishment, which is also cruel and unusual.  Life without parole 
sentences replaced executions of juvenile and mentally retarded 
offenders.  This move does not constitute the adoption of the path of 
mercy, and it could also be a violation of the obligation to act in a 
manner which is not “cruel and unusual” in the sphere of punishment.92  
For juveniles, the severe, unmerciful punishment of life without parole 
is a sentence that, not unlike capital punishment, imposes a “terminal, 
unchangeable, once-and-for-all judgment upon the whole life of a 
human being and declares that a human being is forever unfit to be a 
part of civil society.”93 
III. JEWISH LAW 
Mercy is an essential element and a compelling factor in the 
process of judging the acts of another individual in Judaism and Jewish 
law.  The outlook of mercy is essential also to the path that could lead 
to a conviction in a Jewish court.  Conviction at the end of the process 
of judgment should be the outcome only of a firm conclusion that an 
individual acted in a manner that was a violation of the principles of 
Jewish law.  The Creator of the World directed us to grant due weight 
to mercy and compassion also in this sphere.  Moreover, mercy is an 
 
90 States and Capital Punishment, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGS. (Aug. 11, 2021), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/death-penalty.aspx. 
91 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (concerning criminals with 
developmental disabilities and the limitation of the implementation of the death 
penalty); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 562 (2005) (deciding that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders). 
92 See Barry C. Feld, A Slower Form of Death: Implications of Roper v. Simmons 
for Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 9, 10 (2008) (concerning the constitutional criticism of this harsh 
punishment). 
93 Brief for Petitioner at 5, Sullivan v. Florida, 560 U.S. 181 (2010) (No. 08-7621); 
Michelle Marquis, Graham v. Florida: A Game-Changing Victory for Both Juveniles 
and Juvenile-Rights Advocates, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 255, 266-67 (2011). 
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important and essential consideration at the stage of evaluating the 
appropriate punishment of an individual who has been convicted. 
A. Goal of the Jewish Legal System – The Ultimate 
Truth 
There are two levels of truth in Jewish jurisprudence.  The 
regular truth, emet in Hebrew, and din emet la’amito in Hebrew 
(literally: the law that is the truth in its true form), which, as this 
concept has been understood in Jewish sources, should be translated 
as “the ultimate truth.”  The definition of the Jewish ultimate legal truth 
and the method of implementation of the rules guiding rabbis and 
Jewish courts in this sphere are important when rabbis or Jewish courts 
evaluate a Jew’s acts.  This evaluation should stem from the 
comprehension that the deep and more significant legal desideratum is 
to do what is necessary in light of the ultimate truth – din emet 
la’amito.  This should be the aim of the decision-making process of 
rabbis, at the stage of judgment, and of the rulings of the Jewish court 
(Beit Din), at the stage of punishment. 
In Jewish sources, one finds different interpretations of the 
concept din emet la’amito.  I will present all the interpretations but will 
focus in particular on one of the major trends in Jewish law that grants 
due weight to mercy.  According to this interpretation, din emet 
la’amito is achieved through a process that determines the merciful 
and compassionate essence of each legal decision.  Implementation of 
this approach should lead to the adoption of the legal perspective 
which is “outside the [strict] letter of the law,” in the appropriate 
circumstances.94 
According to this perspective, mercy is an essential element in 
the process of Jewish judgment and punishment.  Adoption of the more 
lenient and generous outlook of mercy, “outside the letter of the law,” 
at the appropriate time and place, should lead to just judgments and 
punishments of Jewish courts, or of rabbis, in their halakhic rulings.  
In this desirable process, the legal decision is not only the outcome of 
the evaluation of the case in light of the principles of the Jewish legal 
system pertaining to a certain legal dilemma, and their correct 
implementation.  The legal decision-making process should also be an 
 
94 See Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 30b (concerning the directive to adopt this 
perspective in Jewish law). 
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expression of the attempt to do what is correct and necessary in light 
of Jewish values.  The Jewish judge and rabbi should evaluate, in each 
case, what they should do to implement these values, including mercy.  
Their legal decision-making policy, in the sphere of punishment as 
well, should aspire to be merciful in appropriate circumstances.  They 
should search for the correct conclusion after evaluating all the facts, 
rules of Jewish law, and circumstances, and attempt to implement the 
values of Judaism in this process.  Jewish judges and rabbis should 
take seriously their obligation to act in the image of the Creator of the 
World and in accordance with what is required by the Lord from all 
Jews.  Jewish judges and rabbis who strive to act in the image of the 
Lord understand that the implementation of Jewish values is necessary 
in the process of application of the existing rules in every case that they 
analyze or adjudicate.  In the ideal process, the Jewish court and the 
rabbi, in addition to examining all the important facts and legal 
arguments in the matter at hand in light of the principles of Jewish law, 
will endeavor to apply the required Jewish values in the Jewish legal 
arena to the greatest extent possible.  They should act, when necessary, 
beyond the letter of the strict and uncompromising law in a merciful 
and compassionate manner.  They should also grant due weight to the 
just outcome, fairness and impartiality, avoid bias, adopt the path of 
pleasantness and peace and enhance compromise and peace in the 
world. 
When Jewish courts or rabbis attempt to implement Jewish 
values and determine what is din emet la’amito and adopt the approach 
that grants due weight to Jewish values in their judgments and rulings, 
mitigating circumstances are important, and occasionally such 
mitigating circumstances justify acting in a kind and compassionate 
manner.  The Jewish court should grant due weight to these special 
circumstances and act in a milder and more generous manner in its 
decisions, when appropriate. 
i. Development of the Principles of Jewish Law: 
Biblical, Tannaitic, and Amoraic Law 
Truth in law is important in the Bible.  In biblical law, Jewish 
judges should be individuals who are guided by an aspiration to 
achieve truth in their proceedings and decisions.95  The ideal law in the 
 
95 Exodus 18, 21. 
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Bible is law that grants significant weight to the truth. At the Biblical 
stage of the development of Jewish law, there is a requirement that the 
goal of the judge and legal system be that the outcome of their activity 
will be the truth.96 
At the next stage of the development of Jewish law, i.e., the 
Tannaitic and Amoraic period, an important goal of the judge and the 
legal system is the ultimate truth (din emet la’amito in Hebrew, lit. true 
law of truth).97  The state of mind required when Jewish courts or 
rabbis set goals for their judicial activity, including their activity when 
they determine the fate of another individual, should be a sincere and 
serious attempt to do what they can  to achieve not only mere truth, but 
the ultimate truth (din emet la’amito).  In sources from the Tannaitic 
and Amoraic period, the ancient Jewish Sages encouraged the Jewish 
judge to adopt the path leading to the ultimate truth in his judgment.  
They praised the Jewish judge who sought to achieve the ultimate truth 
and stated that if he acts in this desirable manner for “even one hour,” 
he becomes a partner of the Creator of the World in the important 
mission of the creation of the world.98  The aspiration to achieve the 
ultimate truth in law and to act in a merciful and compassionate mode 
when the circumstances justify the adoption of this approach should 
also lead to the granting of due weight to mitigating circumstances. 
Implementation of the values of Judaism, in the appropriate 
circumstances, is possible when the judgment in Jewish law is the 
outcome of an evaluation of whether mercy is necessary in a certain 
case, in light of the specific circumstances. 
ii. Development of the Principles of Jewish Law: 
Medieval Jewish Literature 
In medieval Jewish literature there are several explanations of 
din emet la’amito – the goal of the activity of a Jewish court and the 
decision-making process of rabbis.  In interpreting the statements and 
 
96 Ezekiel 18:8. 
97 See Menachem Elon, Truth, Peace, and Conciliation: The Pillars of Law and 
Society, 14 BAR-ILAN L. STUD. 269, 272 n.13 (1998).  Professor Elon stressed that 
there are doubts if “ultimate truth” is the goal of the legal system in tannaitic sources.  
Id.  However, those sources include Mishnah Peah 8:9, which mentioned that the 
goal of the judgment is to discover the ultimate truth.  Id. 
98 See Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 10a; Eruvin 54b; Megilah 15b; Chagigah 14b; 
Bava Batra 8b; Sanhedrin 7a, 111b. 
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debate in texts of the ancient Sages concerning din emet la’amito, 
many medieval commentators explained that the requirement to 
achieve the ultimate truth is the obligation to avoid decisions that are 
a result of mistakes in the evaluation of facts or circumstances.  
According to this definition, the ultimate truth in Jewish law is the 
outcome of an attempt to determine all the relevant true facts and 
circumstances in a particular matter.99  When a Jewish judge or rabbi 
is not sure of the true relevant facts, especially when they have doubts 
about the conviction of a suspect in a criminal trial, they should 
investigate the matter and attempt to reach a decision after determining 
the true relevant facts.  Their investigation should be careful and 
sensitive and as a result their determination of the true facts should 
lead to the true verdict.  Particularly when Jewish authorities suspect 
that their decision in a case might be tainted as a result of perjury, their 
decision should be made only after fulfillment of the obligation to 
ensure a comprehensive investigation of the facts and details relevant 
to the case.  The Spanish Jewish scholar, Rabbi Solomon ben Abraham 
Aderet, stressed the Jewish court that seeks to implement the ultimate 
truth should take care to investigate the matter thoroughly and examine 
all the relevant facts.100 
 At times, the Jewish medieval scholars required that this 
investigation also be conducted outside the courtroom when it was 
necessary in order to enable a litigant to prove his claims and 
determine the relevant facts precisely so as to avoid unfortunate 
mistakes of the legal system.  The activity conducted outside the 
courtroom could be an announcement in the synagogue that any person 
who had information that could be helpful for the Jewish judge or a 
scholar in a certain case should come forward and testify about the 
facts and details.  The additional determination of what is true and what 
is not, which arises from this testimony, assists those attempting to 
arrive at din emet la’amito.  Such an announcement is essential when 
further investigation regarding these facts and details could be 
critical.101  Measures to avoid a tainted decision of a Jewish judge or 
rabbi, who is acting in light of his obligation to implement law that is 
 
99 For more about this legal policy in the medieval responsa literature, see Responsa 
of Rambam 427; Responsa of Rashba 3:88, 186; Responsa of Ritva 97, 208; 
Responsa of Rashbash 229, 411. 
100 See Responsa of Rashba 3:92. 
101 See Responsa of the Sages of Provence 1:60. 
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the ultimate truth, sometimes include the examination and cross-
examination of witnesses, so that the final conclusion and verdict will 
be din emet la’amito.102 
 The fifteenth century Jewish law scholar, Rabbi Joseph Colon, 
wrote that the objective of determining din emet la’amito puts the 
responsibility upon the Jewish judge and rabbi to determine the truth 
by means of a thorough investigation of the facts and consideration of 
the circumstances in light of the arguments of the litigants.103  In 
addition, he wrote that the reasoning of the Jewish court should reflect 
an analysis of all relevant facts and details leading to the goal: the 
ultimate truth.  According to his perspective, the requirement to 
achieve the goal of din emet la’amito imposes upon the Jewish courts 
and rabbi, who are expected to reach a conclusion concerning a certain 
matter, especially when there are doubts, the obligation to do 
everything they can in order to find out the truth.104  Mercy is the 
outcome of uncertainty about this truth.  They should determine the 
true convicting facts only after they are sure they can reach a solid 
conclusion about a conviction, or an obligation in civil matters.  They 
should grant the Jewish individual the right to receive a merciful 
verdict when the fact-finding process leads to the conclusion that he 
can enjoy the benefit of doubt. 
 Furthermore, some Jewish law scholars in the Middle Ages 
wrote that the objective of achieving the ultimate truth in the legal 
system will be achieved when a Jewish court or rabbi attributes 
appropriate importance to the combined application of the values of 
Judaism and the principles of Jewish law in the legal process and in 
their judgments.  The implementation of these values is necessary to 
allow, not only for a review of all relevant factors, but also for a 
significant dialogue between values and law that should ultimately 
lead to the ultimate truth.  There were rabbis who explained that, when 
Jewish courts and rabbis attempt to ensure that their rulings are not 
only true but also the ultimate truth, they must focus on the need to 
adopt a pattern of action that is beyond the letter of law in appropriate 
 
102 See Tosafot, Shabbat 10a, s.v. din emet la’amito; Tosafot, Bava Batra 8b, s.v. din 
emet la’amito. 
103  See Responsa of Rabbi Joseph Colon 118 (Jerusalem 5748); see also RABBI 
YAACOV BEN ASHER, SEFER HATURIM (TUR), HOSHEN MISHPAT ch. 75 (Jerusalem 
1975).  The basis of this policy was the rule in the codification of Jewish Law of 
Rabbi Yaacov ben Asher.  Id. 
104 Id. 
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circumstances.  When the object is the implementation of the ultimate 
truth, in light of what is required at a certain time and place, the Jewish 
judges and rabbis should grant priority, in the appropriate 
circumstances, to a decision-making process that is beyond the letter 
of the law (which is the ultimate truth).  Adoption of this outlook is 
better than the implementation of a decision-making process that is 
guided only by strict and formal legal doctrines. 
 In this spirit, Jewish scholars in the Middle Ages wrote that, 
since the object of a Jewish court or rabbi is a legal decision that is the 
ultimate truth, he should attempt to find out, in the specific case and 
where appropriate, how he can ameliorate the plight of an individual, 
deviate from the general strict rules, and choose the path that is 
“straighter,” that is beyond the strict letter of the law.  The severe 
principles of strict Jewish law, which are only one part of Jewish law 
– its “general assumptions” – should be mitigated. 
This is the view of the Jewish medieval scholar, Rabbi Yitzhak 
Aramah.  He stressed that there is a correct approach when a Jewish 
court or rabbi attempts to act in light of the ultimate truth.  When the 
Jewish decision-making process is an attempt to achieve the ultimate 
truth, rabbis and Jewish courts should deviate from the strict general 
norms of the legal system and adopt the “straighter” path.105  The 
Jewish court or rabbi should understand that in certain circumstances, 
they are required to deviate from the regular strict norms and demands 
of the legal system, and rule in a manner that is appropriate in light of 
the specific and special circumstances of each case.  When they choose 
this path and “straighten” the severity of regular law, the ultimate truth 
ensues.  Jewish judges who seek to apply the approach of the ultimate 
truth prefer mercy and compassion, which are significant factors in 
their legal analysis.  This preference prevents the unnecessary and 
undesirable harsh fate of individuals that might ensue when the 
dominant standard in the legal system is the strict approach of “let the 
law cut through the mountain.”106  Rabbi Aramah stressed that when 
 
105 See Yitzhak Aramah, Akedat Yitzhak, Shemot, Yitro, ch. 43. 
106 See Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 6b.  The Sages there stressed that this is the 
approach attributed to Moses, but according to the alternative mild perspective – that 
of compromise – attributed to Aaron, the better legal policy combines the values of 
mercy and peace in the legal evaluation.  They mentioned the strict standard, of no 
compromise and no peace: “Let the law cut through the mountain,” attributed to 
Moses and not to his brother, Aaron.  The Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 6b states:  
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the legal system chooses this undesirable path and is willing to achieve 
its objectives in a manner that is not appropriate, the ultimate goal of 
justice in law is not achieved.  Strict law is implemented, and the 
outcome for human beings is cruel and non-proportional.107 
 Rabbi Aramah wrote: “[I]ndeed, rabbinical court judges who 
always judge according to the general assumptions, judge in an attempt 
to implement the true law (they apply the basic foundation of law: 
‘truth’).  However, they are the destroyers of the world (because they 
do not also apply the significant additional foundation of ‘ultimate 
truth’).”  108 These judges granted significant weight to the general 
truth and did not attempt to “straighten” it in circumstances that 
justified deviation from the strict law (they did not invoke the 
perspective of “ultimate truth” in their legal activity).  They adopted 
the strict policy: “Let the law cut through the mountain.”109  The 
Psalmist said: “They shall not know, nor shall they understand in the 
darkness they shall walk, all the institutions of the earth shall be 
overthrown.”110  This statement is applicable concerning the most 
damaging and corrupt group of Jewish judges.111 
A similar point of view is reflected in the writings of the Jewish 
scholar and Bible commentator, Rabbi Don Yitzhak Abravanel.112  He 
 
Rabbi Eliezer the son of Rabbi Jose the Galilean says: It is forbidden to 
mediate a dispute, and he who mediates thus offends, and whoever praises 
such a mediator [boze’a] is cursing God . . . . But let the law drill through 
the mountain, for it is written: For the judgment is God’s. And so, Moses 
would say . . . Aaron, however, loved peace and pursued peace and made 
peace between man and man, as it is written: “The law of truth was in his 
mouth. Unrighteousness was not found in his lips, he walked with Me in 
peace and uprightness and did turn many away from iniquity.” 
Id. 
107 See supra note 105. 
108 At this point rabbi Aramah quotes from Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 30b.  
In this text, the Sages state that in the generation of the destruction of the Temple the 
judges implemented the strict law (lit. the law of the Torah) and did not judge 
according to the principles that are lifnim mi-shurat ha-din (“beyond the letter of the 
law”).   
109 See Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 6b. 
110 Psalms 82:5. 
111 Yitzhak Aramah, Akedat Yitzhak, Shemot, Yitro, ch. 43. 
112 See RABBI YITZHAK ABRAVANEL, COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH, DEUTERONOMY 
17:11, s.v. ve’omer shehineh beheter hasafek hashishi.  He wrote: 
[The Temple in] Jerusalem was destroyed because the judges at that time 
implemented only the law of the Torah (lit. biblical law). They 
implemented the general rules of truth (not ultimate truth) but would not 
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explained that the special authority of the Jewish court to act outside 
the boundaries of law that is implemented in regular circumstances 
when necessary in order to act in light of special needs of society, can 
be exercised both when a more strict and severe law is necessary and 
also when a milder policy of mitigation and mercy is necessary.  
Exercise of this authority may also sometimes be necessary in order to 
rectify the severe result when acting in a lenient manner is preferable.  
When the Jewish court or rabbi believes, in a particular case, that his 
decision should be kind and lenient, he should deviate from the regular 
rules and prefer the lenient policy of the path of kindness and mercy, 
in order to achieve the ultimate truth in the decision.  In these 
circumstances, it is necessary to reject the strict policy: “let the law cut 
through the mountain.”113  There is an obligation to soften the severity 
of the law that is implemented in regular circumstances, mitigate it, 
adopt rules and policies that are irregular and unique and to act beyond 
the strict and rigid law. 
Rabbi Yitzhak Aramah and Rabbi Don Yitzhak Abravanel 
stressed that truth and mercy together lead to the just outcome.  The 
ultimate truth is the outcome of an attempt to determine the 
accommodating, specific, and unique circumstances, including the 
mitigating circumstances that may lead to the justified implementation 
of the path of mercy in jurisprudence.  The “pure heart” of mercy and 
compassion is sometimes essential when the Jewish legal system 
attempts to reach the just outcome. 114 
This approach is probably an outcome of the influence of the 
perspective in Aristotle’s philosophical writings in the writings of 
 
straighten the law when it was necessary at a certain time. Their policy 
was: ‘let the law cut through the mountain’ . . . . When their rulings were 
guided by the limited perspective of the general principles of law their 
decisions would not be straight and appropriate [in light of the required 
values that should be implemented] at a certain time . . . . The directive of 
the Sages was to rule in a manner that is the best answer to the needs at a 
certain time. 
Id.  There were scholars who claimed that this outlook was identical to the 
outlook of Rabbi Yitzhak Aramah.  See SARAH HELER-VILENSKY, RABBI 
YITZHAK ARAMAH AND HIS PHILOSOPHY 50-57 (1956); Aaron 
Kirschenbaum, Maimonides and Equity, in MAIMONIDES AS CODIFIER OF 
JEWISH LAW 143-44 (Nahum Rakover ed., 1987). 
113 See Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 6b. 
114 See Psalms 51:12 (“Create in me a pure heart, G-d and renew a steadfast spirit 
within me.”). 
26
Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 [], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss3/6
2021 MERCY IN AMERICAN LAW 1219 
Maimonides.115  Aristotle wrote: “When the law speaks universally . . 
. this is the nature of the equitable, a correction of law where it is 
defective owing to its universality.  In fact, this is the reason why all 
things are not determined by law.”116  Maimonides  emphasized the 
importance of ensuring that the general norms in the legal system be 
adapted to meet the requirements stemming from the special 
circumstances of each case.  He explained that a mechanism for 
correction of the severity or leniency of the regular principles of law is 
necessary.117  In appropriate circumstances that justify the exercise of 
the special authority granted to the Jewish court or rabbi, they should 
provide a fitting response, and act in a different manner.  This activity 
of the court and rabbis might include the enactment of new regulations, 
adopting rules which are different from those that were binding in 
Jewish law in the past, when the needs at a certain time justify this 
enactment.118 
Later, Rabbi Yehoshua Falk Katz, a Jewish scholar who was 
active in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, emphasized that there 
is a connection between the “ultimate truth” and the need to apply 
compassion and mercy, beyond the strict “din Torah,” in the Jewish 
legal system.  Rabbi Falk Katz instructed Jewish courts and rabbis, 
who aspire to the ultimate truth in their decisions to keep in mind, their 
obligation to apply Jewish values and as a result to reach a conclusion 
 
115  Concerning this influence, see MAIMONIDES, STUDIES IN METHODOLOGY, 
METAPHYSICS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 93-123 (Chicago & London, 1990). 
116 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 71-90, 145-62 (W.D. Ross trans., 1999). 
117 See Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, 3:53.  The chapter includes a definition 
of mercy, law and charity.  Law is the exact rule.  Could be merciful or could be 
revenge.  But the desirable activity is in the path of mercy.  The desirable activity is 
to be good to others although the law does not demand this activity.  The path of 
mercy is the path of the Lord.  Mercy and Charity are behaviors that are in the path 
of equity and purify our soul.  See JOSEPH ISAAC, MAIMONIDES ON ETHICS, ch. 8 
(Gorfinkle ed. & trans., 1912) (concerning the cure of the diseases of the Soul, 
Maimonides wrote that “the really praiseworthy is the medium course of action, to 
which everyone should strive to adhere, always weighing his conduct carefully, so 
that he may attain the proper mean . . . the saintly ones . . . deviated somewhat, by 
way of [caution and] restraint.”). 
118 See Itzhak Englard, The Problem of Equity in Maimonides, 21 ISR. L. REV. 296, 
303 (1986); Itzhak Englard, The Problem of Equity in Maimonides, 14-15 SHENATON 
HA-MISHPAT HA-IVRI 31, 37-40 (1989) (Hebrew); Shalom Rosenberg, For the Most 
Part (‘Al Derekh ha-Rov’), 14-15 SHENATON HA-MISHPAT HA-IVRI 189, 194 (1989). 
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that is beyond the strict law (din Torah (lit. biblical law)).119  When the 
Jewish court and rabbi act in the proper, flexible, manner, they grant 
significant weight to the values which are beyond the limited scope of 
din Torah (strict, rigid law) and take into consideration all the possible 
consequences of their rulings, now and in the future, in the day-to-day 
life of those who will be affected, directly and indirectly, by their 
decisions.  In his opinion, Jewish judges and rabbis were given a range 
of discretion and flexibility in exercising the principles of Jewish law 
in order to achieve the desirable goal in their decision-making process: 
their decisions should be not only the “truth” but also the just decision 
in particular circumstances – ultimate truth.120  In his view, the 
“ultimate truth” is not only the outcome of a process applied by Jewish 
courts and rabbis, who have sufficient knowledge concerning the 
relevant legal rules, and who try to reveal and expose, through careful 
investigation, all the true relevant facts.  Justice in law is the ultimate 
truth.  Determination of the “ultimate truth” requires the proper 
operation of the jurisdiction of the Jewish court and rabbi.  This 
process takes place in the heart and soul of the Jewish judge and rabbi.  
Their clean and pure souls should strive for a moral process of 
introspection.  Their thoughts should be about the moral way to 
enhance the implementation of justice in the world.  This is essential 
in the process leading to the “ultimate truth.” 
 The viewpoint of Rabbi Yehoshua Falk Katz is based on the 
assumption that the concept  emet le-amito is tied to the concept of 
“lifnim mi-shurat ha-din,” or the obligation to act in a merciful manner 
that is beyond one’s formal and minimal obligation – “beyond the 
letter of the [strict and harsh] law.”121  He wrote that the Jewish judge 
should act in his decision-making process in the following manner: 
One must judge according to the [requirements of] 
place and time (Judgment that is appropriate in a 
particular place and time), so that his desirable actions 
may be la’amito (they will be the ultimate truth). This 
approach excludes the decision-making process that 
 
119 Din Torah (lit. biblical law) was the strict law that was implemented during the 
generation of the destruction of the Temple.  See Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 
30b. 
120 See RABBI YAACOV BEN ASHER, SEFER HATURIM (TUR), HOSHEN MISHPAT ch. 1 
(Jerusalem:1975) s.v. be’omram kol hadan din emet la’amito. 
121 On the obligation to act “beyond the letter of the law” see supra note 100. 
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always follows the literal [strict] law of the Torah (the 
implementation of the exact [strict and 
uncompromising] rules of din Torah). The Jewish 
judge should not always follow the literal law of the 
Torah (lit. biblical Jewish law). Sometimes he should 
take into consideration the circumstances and 
perspectives of human beings, at a particular time and 
place, and may need to rule lifnim mi-shurat ha-din, 
according to the requirements of the time and the place 
(human circumstances of the case). 122. Should he fail 
to do so (when he does not adopt this approach), even 
though his ruling is the truth according to the narrow 
and formal definition of the concept emet, it is not the 
deeper and full meaning of the concept of truth: - emet 
la’amito.123 
 The final conclusion, in light of the writings of these rabbis, is 
that Jewish courts and rabbis who attempt to achieve the goal of 
ultimate truth in the decision-making process should grant due weight 
to the needs of the persons involved and other human beings who are 
affected by these decisions.  In the appropriate circumstances, they 
should demonstrate empathy towards individuals who will be affected 
by their decisions, and they must adopt a merciful and compassionate 
approach in these decisions.  Their activity must include an in-depth 
consideration of the ramifications of their decisions, in an attempt to 
discover all the possible impacts of any decision on the human life of 
the affected human beings.  If there is a possibility that deciding in a 
strict manner is unnecessary, especially when they anticipate that it 
will probably lead to undue suffering and difficulties for the persons 
concerned, there is an obligation to act in a merciful manner that will 
lead to the ultimate truth.  The outcome of this approach of an 
appropriate evaluation of all the relevant circumstances in light of the 
 
122 In the next stage of presentation of the desirable policy Rabbi Yehoshua Falk Katz 
presents the point   of view of the ancient Jewish Sages in    Babylonian Talmud, 
Bava Metzia 30b,With respect to a court that adopts this wrong path:"[The Temple 
in] Jerusalem was destroyed as a result of the activity of the judges [in the period of 
the destruction of the Temple], who judged according to the law that was din Torah 
(strict, rigid law) and did not add to their judgments an evaluation in light of the 
second essential foundation: “beyond the letter of law” (ultimate truth). 
123 Derisha on Sefer Haturim (Tur), Hoshen Mishpat 1, s.v. be’omram kol hadan din 
emet la’amito. 
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principles of Jewish law should be a deeper, more complete, humane, 
fair process in Jewish law. 
B. Mercy – Essential Element in Judaism and the 
Jewish Decision-Making Process 
Jewish Sages in ancient times stressed that mercy is essential 
as the dominant perspective in Judaism and complementary to the 
strict rules of law.  Some Sages stated that when the Lord created the 
world and acted in the world, His final conclusion was that His main 
teaching must be the teaching of the attribute of mercy.124  According 
to these Sages, there was an essential shift in Judaism and Jewish law 
from the perspective of strict law to that of mercy.  This shift reflected 
an attempt to adopt a pattern of activity that is in the image of the Lord.  
The Sages explained that He knew, after He created the world, that if 
He operates only according to the principles of strict law, the world 
will not survive as a base for the successful activity of human beings 
since they have their mistakes and sins.  Therefore, the shift from strict 
law to mercy is essential.  According to the Sages, the Lord 
understands that mercy is required as an essential component of His 
evaluation and the human evaluation in the human judgment process.  
The Creator uses this outlook to run the world:  
The Lord said: “If I create the world only with the 
attribute of mercy, there will be many sinners; if I create 
it only with the attribute of strict law, the world will not 
survive; rather, I will create it with [the attribute and 
outlook of] strict law and the complementary essential 
 
124 See Otiyot de-Rabbi Akiba 1 (“With the attribute of mercy, I created the world; 
with the attribute of mercy, I direct it; with the attribute of mercy, I will renew it.”); 
see also Sifrei Bambidbar, Pinhas 133 (“He who spoke and created the world has 
mercy on all His creatures”); Tanna De-vei Eliyahu Zuta 6 (“By learning from the 
ways of the Holy One, blessed be He, in the world, you can learn that he acts in great 
mercy in the world.”); Midrash Shoher Tov, Ps. 119 (“David said: ‘Impose upon me  
the mercies in which you created the world.’”  Concerning this, we are told in the 
verse: “You shall bring upon me to your mercy.”  Psalms 119:77 (discussing the 
activity of the lord in the world in the math of mercy); see also Babylonian Talmud, 
Ketubot 50b; Midrash Tanhumah, Noah 6; Genesis, Rabba 33:3; Exodus Rabba 2:1; 
Genesis, Zohar 21. 
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component, mercy, and [I wish that in this pattern] may 
the world last.”125 
The significance of mercy in the world is evident in the Bible 
after the creation of the world too, when the Lord shows Moses His 
attributes as a response to the request, “[s]how me Your glory.”126  He 
clarifies to Moses that as a human being, Moses can only see His 
“back,” not His “face”; therefore, He shows him His attributes, the 
foundations of Judaism.127  When “G-d” explains to Moses His 
dominant outlook, He stresses that beyond truth, He acts in light of 
many other important values, and He is “abundant in kindness.”128  
Many divine attributes, as mentioned in this statement concerning the 
attributes of the Creator of the World, involve compassion and mercy.  
The Creator stated: “Lord, Lord, merciful and gracious G-d, slow to 
anger, abundant in kindness and truth, keeping kindness for thousands, 
forgiving sin, transgression and error.”129  “Truth” is sometimes harsh, 
but all the other attributes are attributes of kindness and mercy.  Mercy 
is the dominant attribute. 
The ancient Jewish text, the Babylonian Talmud, contains an 
explanation of the statement in the Bible.  The Sages explained that 
 
125 Genesis, Rabba 12:19 (Theodor-Albeck ed.); cf. Pesikta Rabbati 45 (concerning 
a similar outlook).  A similar idea is expressed in the Babylonian Talmud, Avoda 
Zara 3b.  In this source, there is a statement about the essential move of God from 
the throne of strict law to the throne of mercy.  Similarly, see this shift in heaven 
toward mercy in the context of the outcome of blowing the ram’s horn (shofar) 
during prayer in the Jewish period of repentance.  Leviticus Rabba 29:3. 
126 Exodus 33, 18. 
127 See Exodus 33, 17-23; 34, 1-7. 
128 See Exodus 34, 6. 
129 Exodus 34, 6-7.  At the end of this statement, according to one possible 
interpretation of this verse in the Bible, there is a one more attribute: “Who clears” - 
this is the thirteenth attribute of mercy, according to the interpretation in Babylonian 
Talmud, Shevuot 39a.  Rabbi Elazar’s explanation there is that the Lord “clears” 
after repentance.  In addition, in the Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 17b, the 
thirteen attributes of mercy are mentioned.  However, the simple meaning of “who 
clears,” as the commentator, Rashi notes ad loc., is that this term is attached to the 
next clause concerning the significance of mercy in ancient Jewish texts.  See also 
Rabbi Menachem ben Shelomo Hameiri, Beit Ha-Bechira, Rosh Hashana 17b.  See 
also Nehemiah 9, 31 (“Nevertheless in Your manifold mercies You did not make a 
full end of them, nor forsake them; for You are a gracious and merciful G-d.”).  In 
addition, G-d is called “The Merciful One” in the Jewish Grace After Meals.  See 
Deuteronomy 8, 10 (concerning the scriptural requirement to recite a blessing after a 
meal). 
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mercy should be the final and dominant stage.  In the Babylonian 
Talmud, Rabbi Elazar explained that the conclusion is that mercy is 
the dominant attribute.130  In similar vein, the Sage Iffi contrasted two 
statements in the biblical verse:131  “It is written, ‘abundant in 
kindness,’ and then it is written, ‘and truth.’ [How is this]? - At first, 
‘truth,’ and at the end ‘abundant in kindness.’”132  At the beginning of 
the biblical verse describing the attributes of the Creator of the World, 
His name is mentioned twice in a row: “Lord, Lord.”  This designation 
of the Creator, according to the Sages, refers to His merciful nature.133 
The thirteen traits in this verse are known collectively as the 
Thirteen Attributes of Mercy.134  In the Jewish prayer, especially on 
fast days – including Yom Hakipurim, the major day of atonement – 
when every Jew seeks to benefit from the mercy of the Lord, these 
thirteen attributes are recited several times.  An ancient Jewish Sage, 
Rabbi Judah, stated: “A covenant has been made [between the Lord 
and human beings], pertaining to the thirteen attributes, that [when 
they are recited] they will not be turned away [by the Lord, who will 
leave the requesting individuals] empty-handed.”135  Under this 
covenant, recitation of these attributes of mercy arouse the mercy of 
the Lord in Heaven, and the requests of human beings are not 
rejected.136 
The Sages also explained that the noble “power” of the Lord is 
not physical strength nor His power in nature.  His noble “power” is 
expressed when He holds back from using his power and acts with 
pardon and mercy towards His creatures.  His noble choice not to 
overuse His power is heroic.137  The ideal course of action is 
 
130 See Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 17b. 
131 See Exodus 34, 6-7. 
132 Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 17b. 
133 A number of sources indicate that the meaning of the term “Lord,” when the Bible 
mentions the Creator of the World, is the Creator that adopts the path of mercy.  See 
Mekhilta, Beshalah 13; Sifrei, Va’et’hanan 27; Genesis, Rabba 33:3; Babylonian 
Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 17b; see also Rashi ad loc., s.v. “Lord, Lord” (explaining 
that the repetition of the name of the Creator - “Lord, Lord” - refers to His mercies 
before and after sin, respectively). 
134 See Midrash Numbers Rabba 21:17. 
135 Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 17b. 
136 See Rashi on Rosh Hashanah 17b, s.v. berit keurtah lishlosh esreh midot. 
137 In Babylonian Talmud, Megilla 31a, Rabbi Yohanan equates the Lord’s greatness 
with His humility.  In light of the verses in which it is written that the Creator of the 
World cares for the weak in society, for the orphan and for the widow, for the victim 
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established in Scripture: “[t]he Lord is slow to anger, abundant in 
kindness, forgiving sin and transgression”;138 “G-d Lord, You have 
begun to show Your servant Your greatness and Your strong hand.”139  
The Sages explained how the greatness of the Lord is evident when He 
is “slow to anger, abundant in kindness, forgiving sin and 
transgression.”140  The strong right hand of the Lord is stretched out in 
kindness, mercy, forgiveness, and pardon for all the creatures in the 
world.  His “[right strong] hand” is strong because He prefers the path 
of mercy over the path of strict law.  He suppresses the overuse of 
strength, ensures there is no unnecessary stubbornness, or arbitrary 
decision-making or cruelty, in His activity141  The Sages presented 
their outlook that the Lord prefers the path of forgiveness and 
compassion.142  
The Sages also stressed that a human being should adopt this 
way of the Lord.  He should adopt the path of mercy, and the readiness 
to forbear and not be trapped in negative emotions.  This is true human 
power.  Overcoming anger, vengeance, and other negative emotions in 
 
of the oppressor and for the individual who is low in spirit, he states that the 
“greatness” of the Lord is His activity in a “humble” manner.  Id. 
138 Numbers 14, 18. 
139 Deuteronomy 3, 24. 
140 See Exodus 34, 6-7. 
141 See SIFREI BAMIDBAR, 180-81 (H.S. Horovitz ed., Jerusalem 1966) (“‘Your 
greatness’ - this is Your goodness, as is stated: ‘And now the strength of the Lord 
will grow.’  ‘And your hand’ this is Your right hand, stretched out [in kindness and 
mercy] to all the people in the world . . . ‘The strong [hand]’ - You conquer with 
mercy the strictness in law.  This is stated in the verse: ‘Who is like you [the Lord] - 
who bears a sin and transgresses a crime.’”).  See Micah 6,18-20; see also 
Deuteronomy 3, 24). 
142 Some claimed that enforcement in the ancient Jewish criminal law system was 
weak, leading to the policy of the ancient Jewish courts not to convict criminals 
although they were morally culpable, only stating only that they are morally 
culpable.  According to this perspective, the legal acquittal of those who are suspects 
in Jewish criminal law is a result of the weakness of the enforcement system in 
Jewish law.  See P. Dickstein, Development of the Jewish Criminal Law System Until 
the Redaction of the Talmud, 1 HA-MISHPAT HA-IVRI 198 (1926).  However, I believe 
that many acquittals may have resulted from the Sages’ views concerning the 
significant weight of mercy in the Jewish legal system, especially in capital 
punishment cases.  The Sages believed that Jews have to follow the directives of the 
Lord and choose His path.  The “greatness” of a Jewish court is not the adoption of 
a harsh policy, with many convictions.  The path of mercy leads to many acquittals 
or milder punishments of individuals who should be given the benefit of doubt or 
who perpetrated their crimes in mitigating circumstances. 
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the relationship between Jews, in the Jewish legal system and in other 
spheres of activity of Jews, is the appropriate expression of power.  
The Jewish hero “conquers his temptation.”143  Implementation of this 
policy contributes to strengthening social values such as mutual 
support and hope for a better future for all members of society. 
The way of mercy of the Creator when requests in prayer are 
presented to Him is evident in a passage in the Babylonian Talmud 
explaining the format of G-d’s decision-making process when 
deciding if He will be merciful concerning requests of Jews in their 
prayers.  The Talmud states that an individual should not recite the 
Mussaf prayer in the first three hours of the day.  During these hours, 
the Holy One focuses upon the exact, uncompromising principles of 
Judaism and His pattern of activity, concerning requests of the 
creatures in the world, is the adoption of the strict standard.  The 
Jewish individual should recite the Mussaf prayer during the next three 
hours of the day 
because [at that stage] the Lord, who implemented at 
the first stage the strict standard of ‘law,’ reaches the 
conclusion that the world will be destroyed if the 
standard of His evaluation will be strict.  He therefore 
abandons this approach (lit. abandons his seat of ‘law’) 
of severe and strict judgment, and adopts the 
perspective of mercy.144 
At this stage, His acceptance of the petition of the person who 
prays to him is not limited to a narrow and strict perspective, based 
upon what should be accepted and not accepted according to the strict 
standard.145  During the hours that are suitable for the Mussaf prayer, 
“The Holy One, blessed is He, grants due weight to the standard [of 
mercy] which is beyond the strict letter of law.”146  He does not judge 
human beings only according to the strict letter of law.  The prayer 
during this appropriate time – of compassion and fulfillment of 
 
143 Mishnah, Avot 4:1. 
144 See Babylonian Talmud, Avodah Zarah 3b. 
145  Rashi on Avodah Zarah 3b, s.v. din lo ketiv bey emet.  The outcome of this 
commentary should be that judges in a Jewish court, who should act in light of the 
guidance of the Lord, should also prefer the approach of mercy in the decisions of a 
Jewish court. 
146 Babylonian Talmud, Avodah Zarah, 4b. 
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requests – could enhance the probability of achievement of the goal 
The Lord will be kind and accept the requests in prayer. 
i. Mercy in Jewish Courts and Rulings of Rabbis 
1. The Ancient Sages 
In the ancient biblical texts, there are no explicit directives to 
judges to act in accordance with to their obligation to follow the path 
of mercy of the Lord.  However, all Jews, including Jewish judges, are 
bound to act, in a manner that is in the image of the Lord.147  The 
attributes of mercy are an ideal, and should guide all Jews in their 
activity, since every Jew must walk in the path which was paved for 
him by the Lord and imitate the pattern of conduct of the Creator.  In 
court, too, they must act in light of Jewish morals and ethics and fulfill 
the obligation of all Jews to imitate the ways of the Lord and adopt His 
path of mercy.148 
In the Tannaitic and Amoraic period that followed, the Sages 
stressed in their exegesis that adoption of this pattern, the act of 
imitatio Dei, is essential for all Jews.149  In the medieval period, Jewish 
law and Jewish philosophy sources provided an explanation 
 
147 See Deuteronomy 26, 16-17; 28, 9. 
148 Biblical law requires that every Jew will walk in the ways of the Lord.  See id. 
149 The Sage Abba Shaul, interpreting Exodus 15, 2, stated that a Jew should act in 
the image of the Creator: “I shall act like him.  He is merciful and gracious, You too 
should be merciful and gracious.”  3 MEKHILETA DE-RABBI YISHMAEL, BESHALAH, 
PARASHAH 127 (Horowitz-Rabin ed., 1931); Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 133b; see 
also Yalkut Shim’oni, Exodus 15, 245; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah De’ot 1:6.  This 
approach of the Sages is evident in another source, Sifrei, Ekev 49t: “The attribute 
of the Lord is merciful, you also should be merciful.  The Holy One, blessed be He, 
pardons and is gracious, you also should pardon and be gracious.”  Cf.  Midrassh 
Tanchuma, Vayishlach 10:4, s.v. yelamdenu rabbenu; Tanna De-bei Eliyahu Rabba 
24, s.v. bi-zman she-adam mekhabbed; Babylonian Talmud, Sotah 14a.  A similar 
outlook is evident in the ancient sources that state that the Lord implanted mercy in 
the hearts of human beings.  See Jerusalem Talmud, Berakhot 5:3; Tanna De-bei 
Eliyahu Rabba, 29; see also the Rabbi David Kimchi (Radak) & Metzudat David, 
Commentary, I Kings 2:3.  However, in some ancient sources, the perspective is 
different.  According to these sources, at the first stage there is no mercy of the Lord.  
His shift to mercy emerges in His response to requests in prayers of pious individuals.  
See Babylonian Talmud, Sukkah 14a; see also Tanna De-bei Eliyahu Zuta, 7; 
Jerusalem Talmud, Ta’anit 4:5 (concerning the requirement that individuals perform 
the desirable acts that lead to the mercy of the Lord). 
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concerning the essence of this pattern of desirable activity for all Jews.  
One of these medieval sources was the Sefer Hahinukh,150 probably 
authored by a Jewish scholar in Spain in the thirteenth or fourteenth 
century.151  In this work, the essence of all commandments in the Bible 
is explained.  One of these commandments is the obligation to walk in 
the path which was paved for each Jew by the Lord.  The author 
explains: 
It is a commandment to imitate the good and righteous 
ways of the Lord . . . . He commanded us to do all our 
deeds in our relationship with other individuals in the 
path of kindness and mercy, with all our power. We 
should divert all our activity, in our relationships with 
other people, to the path of mercy and compassion, 
since we know that in the Bible this is the path of the 
Lord, and He desires that human beings will adopt the 
path of mercy. If they act in this manner they will 
benefit from the goodness of the Creator, since He 
desires that they be kind and gracious, and this 
commandment is stated in the words in the verse: “And 
you shall walk in His ways.”152 The Lord is Merciful, 
you also should be merciful.153 
This guidance is also applicable in a Jewish court.  Mercy and 
rulings which are beyond the strict letter of law are essential in the 
sphere of the activity of judges as well and should also be evident when 
they evaluate facts and legal arguments of individuals according to the 
principles of Jewish law.  The result of the deliberations of Jewish 
judges and rabbis, who adopt the ways of the Lord, should be a 
desirable relationship among law, truth, compassion and mercy.154  It 
 
150 A book that explains the essence of all the commandments of the Creator in the 
Bible. 
151 There are different views about the identity of the author of this book. 
152 See Deuteronomy 28, 9; see also Deuteronomy 5, 30; 8, 6; 10, 12; 11, 22; 13, 5; 
19, 9; 26:17; 30,16 (concerning the commandment 611). 
153 Sefer Hahinukh, Commandment 611. 
154 See Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 17b.  In this text, the Sages explained 
that G-d’s activity as a judge is as follows: first He acts according to the strict letter 
of the law, and subsequently, following further evaluation, He acts in light of the 
assumption that mitigation of the strict law is necessary because the world cannot 
survive when the strict laws are implemented.  See Babylonian Talmud, Rosh 
Hashanah 17b; see also Tosafot ad loc. s.v. ba-tehila. 
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should lead to the adoption of a merciful and compassionate outlook, 
in the appropriate circumstances.  Implementation of this policy should 
lead to the achievement of the goal: an appropriate and just outcome.155  
Mercy in the judgments and punishments of Jewish courts, and in the 
halakhic rulings of rabbis, is essential in the appropriate 
circumstances. 
The ancient Sages stressed that the commandment to act in a 
merciful manner is even more important for powerful individuals, who 
can inflict more damage by misusing their power.  These individuals 
in particular, including judges, must have mercy on their fellow men 
when determining their fates, and act beyond the letter of the strict law, 
in the appropriate circumstances.156  There is a moral demand that 
these individuals act, in appropriate circumstances, beyond the strict 
letter of law.157 
The principle that judges should act in a merciful manner, when 
possible, is evident in the literature of the Sages in various contexts.  
In certain areas of judicial activity, the Sages grant great significance 
to mercy.  One context is the eligibility for nomination as a judge in 
the Sanhedrin, the ancient supreme Jewish legislating instance and 
supreme Jewish court.  The Sages stated that an elderly, castrated or 
childless individual is ineligible for nomination as member of the 
Sanhedrin.158  The common medieval reason given for this rule is that 
these individuals do not feel the grief of child-rearing, and therefore, 
they may act in an unjustifiably cruel manner in their activity in the 
Sanhedrin.159  This rule might apply only to the criminal sphere, when 
judges must decide a person’s fate, and the decision might impinge on 
one’s life, good name, and honor.  The consequences of the judgment 
 
155 See Zohar, Leviticus, 65 (explaining the clear view that wherever justice exists, 
mercy exists). 
156 The commandment is directed to the king as well.  He should ensure the world is 
corrected and not do any evil; he should be a leader of the people of his subjects 
adopting the path of mercy.  See RABBI DAVID ADANI, MIDRASH HA-GADOL, 
EXODUS 21:1, 452 (Jerusalem 1976). 
157 See Y. Rosenberg, Kol Ha-omer…Eino Ela To’eh, 4 NETUIM 79, 79-88 (1998). 
158 See Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 36b.  In the medieval period, there were those 
who interpreted this rule as follows: even if the judge was fit to be a judge at the time 
of appointment but has become elderly or castrated, he is disqualified at present and 
must be removed.  See Responsa of Rashba 6:191.  See also Responsa of Hatam 
Sofer, Yoreh De’ah 7. 
159 See Rashi, Commentary, Sanhedrin 36b, s.v zaken; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, 
Sanhedrin 2:3. 
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in criminal law, especially the punishment, may be particularly severe.  
Maimonides states that this rule applies to “capital punishment law.”160  
However, capital punishment in Jewish law was abolished before his 
day, at the time of the ancient Sages,161  Maimonides did not state that 
this rule is irrelevant in the medieval period.  It is possible that in the 
writings of Maimonides, the category “capital punishment law” 
belongs in the sphere of Jewish criminal law.  It includes crimes that 
do not lead to the death penalty.  According to Menachem Elon, who 
does not interpret “capital punishment” literally but according to the 
context of its implementation in Jewish sources – “capital punishment 
law” in Jewish law refers to all spheres of Jewish criminal law.162  
According to the medieval interpretation of the rule in the 
Talmud, the elderly, castrated or childless are not totally disqualified 
in the Jewish courts.  Medieval Jewish law scholars stated that these 
individuals can testify in legal proceedings and can also adjudicate in 
monetary matters, as mercy is not needed in the same manner in this 
area.163  The main rationale for these rules is that in testifying, an 
individual does not fulfill the role of a judge who determines the fate 
of the suspect in criminal cases.  In addition, in monetary matters, 
mercy shown to one litigant could lead to a harsh and unjustified 
outcome from the point of view of the other litigant.  In civil conflicts 
– in which the fate of a person is not usually determined with the same 
severe ramifications as are common in criminal law, especially in 
serious cases – the legal system does not impose strict eligibility 
requirements to ensure that the Jewish judge will be merciful and 
compassionate, when the implementation of such a policy is possible. 
2. No Pity is to be Shown? 
 Indeed, Rabbi Akiba, the Tannaitic Sage, states: “No pity is 
to be shown when there are rules in the law pertaining to a legal 
 
160 See Mishneh Torah, Testimony 16:6. 
161 See infra note 233 and accompanying text. 
162  See MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES (HA-
MISHPAT HA-IVRI) 149-50 (2d ed., 1978). 
163 See Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Testimony 16:6 (stating that they may testify 
but not judge capital cases); see also Rabbi Joseph Karo, Commentary, Kessef 
Mishneh (explaining that a similar rationale is applicable to the childless, as they too 
are not merciful.  However, the elderly, childless and the castrated may judge 
monetary cases). 
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matter.”164  However, this does not negate the use of mercy in criminal 
law, since the context of this statement is important.165  This was the 
rule pertaining to a monetary dispute.  The dispute mentioned in the 
Mishnah concerned a man who died and left a wife, who claimed she 
was entitled to her monetary rights stemming from the marriage, 
granted to her in the ketubah.  However, a creditor claiming the 
repayment of his debt, and heirs expecting their inheritance, had their 
own monetary claims.  The deceased husband had a deposit or a loan 
in the possession of others.  In this case, Rabbi Tarfon ruled that the 
money would be given to the individual in this dispute who is under 
the greatest disadvantage.  Rabbi Akiba had a contrary point of view: 
“No pity is to be shown when there are rules in the law pertaining to a 
legal matter.”166  In criminal law, however, Rabbi Akiba supported the 
implementation of mercy as an important consideration.  He rejected 
bias in the legal process in favor of the weak litigants in monetary civil 
conflicts, in which the bias in favor of one side is necessarily an 
unjustified bias, from the perspective of the other parties, against the 
other side.  This position was based on the Biblical prohibitions of 
showing favoritism to a pauper.167  In criminal law, his general position 
was expressed in his rejection of capital punishment.  This punishment 
would require the use of the cruelest punishment: death.  Mercy in 
criminal law requires the shift from biblical law to the law of the Sages: 
de facto the death penalty is abolished.  Rabbi Akiba and Rabbi Tarfon 
were in agreement about capital punishment.  They stated that if they 
were members of the superior legislative body and Supreme Court ― 
the Sanhedrin ― “No one would be killed” as a result of the legal 
process in this Court.168  Maybe this would be the special policy 
 
164 Mishnah Ketubot 9:2. 
165 Indeed, Rabbi Samson Rafael Hirsch favored a general policy of a strict approach 
in relation to punishments of court.  In his commentary, he wrote that in a legal 
system, there is no need to give the benefit of the doubt to the accused.  See Rabbi 
Samson Rafael Hirsch, Commentary, Leviticus 19, 15 (2012).  However, this outlook 
seems to contradict the policy in many other Jewish sources, according to which the 
court must argue and raise claims that may lead to the acquittal of the accused, 
particularly in capital punishment cases. 
166 Mishnah Ketubot 9:2. 
167 See Exodus 23, 3; see also Leviticus 19, 15. 
168 See Mishnah, Makot 1:10.  The Mishnah also presents the strict point of view of 
Raban Gamliel, that as a result of the implementation of the policy of Rabbi Akiba 
and Rabbi Tarfon there will be less deterrence and more murders in the population.  
Id. 
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pertaining to capital punishment, which is irreversible, since after this 
punishment, there is no option of correcting mistakes.  However, this 
is probably the outcome of a general policy.  Rabbi Akiba held that the 
biblical prohibition on showing favoritism to the poor forbids twisting 
the law in a civil case to benefit the disadvantaged and weak.169 
The statement of Rabbi Akiba and Rabbi Tarfon coincides with 
the shift from biblical law to the law of the Sages that abolished, de 
facto, the death penalty in the period of the Sages.  The general trend 
in Jewish law in the period of the Sages is a shift from the strict outlook 
of biblical law to an approach that focuses upon mercy in relation to 
the most severe ultimate penalty – capital punishment.  Rabbi Akiba 
also interprets the rule pertaining to mercy in a verse in the Bible170 as 
forbidding the execution of minors along with the rest of the residents 
of an apostate city.171  The same verse is used in the literature of the 
Sages as support for mercy being a defining characteristic of Jews.172 
3. The Medieval Period 
 The desire to avoid unnecessary harsh activity of judges in 
the sphere of Jewish criminal law is evident also in sources in the 
medieval period.  Rabbi Solomon ben Abraham Aderet stressed that 
especially when the decision of the court concerning the punishment 
of a criminal might be powerful and too severe, it is important that the 
Jewish judges exercise more “supervision” and caution and ensure that 
their mode of activity is mild and moderate.173  They should take into 
consideration the human factor and the significance of mercy and try 
to avoid decisions that are the outcome of anger.174  The guiding 
 
169 His opposition is not to mercy in the legal process but rather to unfairly favoring 
a weak litigant in this process.  In the Mishnah, the question is whether preference 
should be given to the widow, who is considered to be disadvantaged over other 
litigants, such as the heirs.  J.D. EISENSTEIN, OTZAR DINIM U -MINHAGIM 82 (1917) 
(arguing that the rule of Rabbi Akiba applies to a certain type of civil claim: mercy 
towards a damager in the context of fines). 
170 Deuteronomy 13, 18. 
171 See Tosefta Sanhedrin 14:3 (Zuckermandel ed.). 
172 See Babylonian Talmud, Yebamot 79a; Deuteronomy Rabba, Ekev 3, 4. 
173 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
174 See Responsa of Rashba 5:238; see also Rabbi Menachem ben Shlomo Hameiri 
in BEIT HA-BEHIRAH, Gittin 241 (Jerusalem 5724-1964) (stating in another context, 
“Never shall a person act in a manner that is contrary to the desirable attributes [of 
the Lord], and he should not be strict and cruel to his enemies and should not act in 
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principle in decision making concerning punishments in Jewish law is 
expressed in the following statement: “Most Jewish scholars (courts 
and rabbis) acted with extreme caution when they exercised their 
power of punishment and were very careful not to impose an 
[unjustified] extreme punishment.”175 
 It is clear that even in the dispute between litigants in the 
realm of monetary matters, some medieval rabbis praised the practice 
in Jewish decision making of judgments in favor of the weaker party.  
When there is no significant harm to the other party as a result of bias 
by the judge in favor of the weak and the weaker litigant, the 
“pauper,”176 which harms another litigant unlawfully, even in 
monetary matters the judge or rabbi should rule “beyond the letter of 
the strict law,” in light of the attribute of mercy.  Rabbi Chaim Ben 
Yechiel, a medieval Ashkenazi Sage, dealt with a monetary dispute 
between a widow and her orphaned son.  He wrote that in his opinion, 
the legal claims of the orphan were more convincing and the case 
should not be judged in favor of the weaker litigant, the widow, since 
in monetary matters the rule is, “No pity is to be shown when there are 
rules in the law pertaining to a legal matter.”177  Nevertheless, at the 
end of his ruling on this matter, he attributed certain weight to the 
attribute of mercy even though the matter was a monetary one.  He 
wrote that he was willing to allow an additional act to be performed in 
favor of the widow “beyond the strict letter of the law.”  She had eight 
days in which she could consult with other individuals who were 
familiar with the principles of Jewish law regarding his ruling and his 
reasoning.  If their claims on appeal would be convincing, he would 
retract this ruling, and rule in favor of the widow.178 
 Another medieval scholar of Franco-German Jewry, Rabbi 
Jacob Molin, discussed the request of a widow to allow her to live in a 
place where a “ban on settlement in the place [of nonresidents]” 
applied.  It was argued, inter alia, that she was “forced” to remain there 
since she was ill.  Initially, Rabbi Molin rejected the claim that he 
should rule in favor of the widow since she was the poor, weaker, 
 
a manner that is contrary to morality as a result of his hatred or his desire to 
revenge.”). 
175  Eliyahu Ben-Zimra, Considerations of Punishment in Jewish Criminal Law as 
Reflected in Responsa Literature, 8 SHENATON HA-MISHPAT HA-IVRI 36 (1981). 
176 See Exodus 23, 3; Leviticus 19, 15. 
177 Mishnah, Ketubot 9:2. 
178 See Responsa of Maharam 249. 
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litigant and “needed assistance.”179  He explained that as long as she 
did not have a right to settle in that place according to the law, due to 
the ban on settlement in the place, enacted by the Jewish community, 
the residents of that place were not obligated to act more charitably 
than other Jews.180  According to the principles of strict law, all Jews 
share the burden of charity equally.  Only if there is a custom in this 
community to permit the settlement of weaker non-residents would the 
widow have a solid legal claim.  Nevertheless, he wrote that although 
the rule of the Sages is that “No pity is to be shown when there are 
rules in the law pertaining to a legal matter,” and therefore it is not 
appropriate to rule in favor of the widow because we feel sorry for her, 
there is a new medieval rule in Jewish Franco-German sources.  
According to the new rule, when possible, in light of the circumstances 
of the case, a Jew is bound by Jewish law to fulfill his obligation to act 
beyond the letter of the strict law.181  According to this medieval 
outlook, the rule “No pity is to be shown when there are rules in the 
law pertaining to a legal matter” does not prohibit the implementation 
of mercy and compassion in appropriate circumstances.182  However, 
in this case the rule pertaining to the “ban on of settlement in the place” 
was important and enhanced the welfare of the members of the local 
community.  It prevented commercial competition that could endanger 
the economic stability of the members of the local community.  
Therefore, Rabbi Molin’s conclusion was that only in special 
extraordinary circumstances, such as the settlement in the community 
of a rabbi who teaches the principles of Jewish law, was this general 
rule not applicable.  Mercy on behalf of a widow does not justify 
deviation from this important rule. 
4. Mercy and Ruling Beyond the Strict 
Letter of the Law in Jewish Law and 
Courts in the Twentieth Century 
 The obligation to act in a merciful manner in a Jewish court 
and in the halakhic decisions of rabbis is evident in modern times in 
 
179 See Responsa of Maharil ha-Hadashot 147. 
180 Id. 
181  In this responsum, he mentioned the point of view of Rabbi Eliezer Ben Yoel 
Halevi, quoted at the end of Mordechai, Bava Batra 482, that it is “appropriate to 
have mercy on the poor, when the circumstances justify this activity.” 
182 See Responsa of Maharil ha-Hadashot 147. 
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the writings of influential Chief Rabbis of the Land of Israel in the 
twentieth century.  In his commentary to the Jewish prayer book, Rabbi 
Abraham Yitzchak Hacohen Kook, the first Chief Rabbi of the Land 
of Israel, explained the deeper meaning of statements in verses in 
Psalms that are part of the Sabbath morning prayer: 
The law of the Lord is perfect, restoring the soul; the 
testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple. 
The precepts of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart; 
the commandment of the Lord is pure, enlightening the 
eyes. The fear of the Lord is clean, enduring forever; 
the ordinances of the Lord are true, they are righteous 
altogether. More to be desired are they then gold, yea, 
than much fine gold; sweeter also than honey and the 
honeycomb. Who can discern his errors? Clear Thou 
me from hidden faults.183 
According to Rabbi Kook, the ultimate goal of Jewish law is stated in 
these verses.  The verse states: “The ordinances of the Lord are true, 
they are righteous altogether.”184  Rabbi Kook explained that human 
private law is not perfect and pure:  it is “very complicated and vague 
. . . serves material interests . . . and has many defects . . . many defects 
lead to the conclusion of absence of truth.”185  On the other hand, 
Jewish law, the law of the Lord, is an attempt to remedy all these 
defects, and as a result His law is “true… righteous altogether,” a law 
of truth and justice.186  The implementation of this law leads to good 
feelings of “light,” “happiness,” and “total perfection” in the eternal 
soul of human beings.187  He stressed that the goal of the laws of the 
Lord is not only to “solve temporary disputes in life of human beings,” 
but to “elevate life and universe from the low place of the sinner to the 
‘High Holy’ Place of the ‘Holy of Holies.’”188  The overall 
appropriateness of the details of the Jewish legal system to all that life 
 
183 Psalms 19:7, 10-13. 
184 See Psalms 19:10. 
185  See RABBI ABRAHAM YITZCHAK HACOHEN KOOK, OLAT REIYA II 57-58 
(Jerusalem 1949) (“The ordinances of the Lord are true, they are righteous 
altogether.”).  
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 56 (“The law of the Lord is perfect, restoring the soul.”). 
188 Id. at 59 (“Moreover, by them is Thy servant warned; in keeping of them there is 
great reward.”). 
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and the universe need, is the element of sweetness of the laws of the 
Lord.189 
His other writings also emphasize the significance of mercy in 
Jewish law in a more direct manner.  Rabbi Kook, who was also active 
in the sphere of decision-making in Jewish law, cited the text from the 
Talmud declaring that the temple in Jerusalem was destroyed because 
the judges, members of the court in the Destruction generation, based 
their verdicts solely “on the basis of [strict] Torah law and did not go 
beyond the letter of the law.”190  He explained that the policy of 
implementing strict law should not prevent the implementation of 
mercy in law, including the practice of showing favoritism to a 
pauper.191  In justified circumstances, the principle pertaining to the 
pauper does not preclude mercy and acting beyond the letter of the law 
in Jewish judicial process:  
The attribute of mercy is an important guideline, 
especially in legislation in Jewish law . . . also in the 
decisions of Jewish judges in private matters . . . . The 
obligation to act beyond the letter of the law, in 
appropriate circumstances, is part of the rule of law. 
The Sages stated that the Temple in Jerusalem was 
destroyed because the judges in the generation of the 
Destruction only implemented the strict principles of 
law and did not judge beyond the strict letter of the law 
[when that was required].192 This basic approach is also 
relevant when we interpret the commandment in the 
[Biblical] verse: “Do not favor a pauper in his 
dispute.”193 This verse determines that according 
weight to mercy is not permitted [in behalf of the 
pauper] only when the judge does not pay attention at 
all to the strict rules of the law, but issues his decision 
only as a result of his mercy for the pauper. However, 
 
189 See id. at 58 (“More to be desired are they than gold, yea, than much fine gold; 
sweeter also than honey and the honeycomb.”). 
190 See Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 30b (utilizing this author’s translation and 
explanation); cf. Yalkut Shimoni, Iggeret Ha-Rav Kook, in SEFER ZIKARON LE-
AVRAHAM SPIEGELMAN 1085 (1991) (“Jerusalem was destroyed solely due to 
corruption of justice.”). 
191 See Exodus 23, 3; Leviticus 19, 15. 
192 See Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 30b. 
193 Exodus 23, 3; see also Leviticus 19, 15. 
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when proper weight is also given in the decision-
making process to the regular principles of law and the 
fundamental principles of Jewish law, the judge should 
also act, when appropriate, in light of his legal right to 
incorporate in the legal process the attributes of mercy 
and compassion, in order to assist the unfortunate, lost, 
and oppressed human beings.194 
Later in the twentieth century, two influential Chief Rabbis of 
the Land of Israel, Rabbi Yitzchak Herzog and Rabbi Benzion Chai 
Ouziel, stressed yet again that adopting the path of mercy, paved by 
the Lord, is an essential activity of a Jewish judge. 
According to Rabbi Herzog, the judge should attribute 
importance to basic Jewish values in the judicial process.195  This 
includes granting preference to mercy over the severity of strict law in 
a manner leading to “just law” and doing “what is good” in the judicial 
process whenever possible.196 
Rabbi Herzog cited the talmudic interpretation of the verse in 
Micah: “It hath been told thee, O man, what is good, and what the Lord 
doth require of thee: only to do just law, and to love mercy, and to walk 
humbly with your Lord.”197  The Sages explained that in this verse, the 
prophet Micah condensed the commandments of the Five Books of 
Moses into three basic principles: “To do justice, to love kindness and 
to walk humbly with your Lord.”198  Rabbi Herzog explained that these 
are also the three guidelines for judges in a Jewish court who 
implement principles of Jewish law.199  The highest level of mercy is 
the love of kindness and mercy.200  There should be a “constant desire 
to act in a merciful manner.”201  He stressed that: 
strict law is not the height of the Jewish ideal [in the 
judicial process]; rather, this ideal is going beyond the 
letter of the law: The prophet Micah condensed the 
 
194 RABBI ABRAHAM YITZCHAK HACOHEN KOOK, IGGERET HA-RAV KOOK, SEFER 
ZIKARON LE-AVRAHAM SPIEGELMAN 67 (A. Morgenstern ed., 5739-1979). 
195 See Yitzchak Herzog, Battei Din Be-Yisrael, 7 TECHUMIN 278-29 (5746-1986). 
196 See id. 
197 Micah 6, 8. 
198 See Babylonian Talmud, Makkot 24a. 
199 See Yitzchak Herzog, Battei Din Be-Yisrael, 7 TECHUMIN 278-279 (5746-1986). 
200 See id. 
201 See id. 
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basic principles of Judaism to three basic principles: 
“To do justice, to love kindness.” There are three 
degrees [of activity of judges], each one superior to the 
other: “To do justice” – is [acting in the sphere of 
regular strict] law; above this degree is “to love 
kindness” – acting in a merciful manner, beyond the 
letter of the strict law. And there is also a higher aspect 
to this degree. In Judaism, mercy in a person’s actions 
is not sufficient. Judaism not only mandates the 
implementation of the attribute of kindness in practice: 
the higher level is kindness, mercy and compassion in 
the heart – “to love kindness.” This “love” is the 
constant desire to act in a merciful manner – the inner 
desire to perform kind deeds. The third, higher and 
ultimate level is “to walk humbly with your Lord” – to 
always be filled with the internal knowledge that the 
whole world is filled with His glory. Certainly, strict 
law is not the height of the Jewish ideal [in the judicial 
process]; rather, the ideal is to go beyond the letter of 
the biblical law.202 
He further explained that only in extraordinarily specific cases, 
the special aggravating circumstances lead to the conclusion that “[w]e 
do not show mercy in law”203 or that judges should “let the law cut 
through the mountain.”204  But, this is not the general rule guiding the 
activity of Jewish judges.  The basic principle in Jewish courts is stated 
in Deuteronomy: “And thou shalt do that which is right and good in 
the sight of the Lord.”205  According to this principle, a Jewish judge 
must act in light of the assumption that the general overarching 
principles of Jewish law “are rooted in abundant mercy and 
morality.”206  According to Rabbi Herzog’s outlook in this text, in 
order to prevent “distortion of the law,” a clear and direct integration 
of the principles of Jewish law with mercy is essential, when it is 
 
202 Yitzchak Herzog, Battei Din Be-Yisrael, 7 TECHUMIN 277, 278-79 (5746-1986) 
(emphasis added). 
203 See Mishnah Ketubot 9:2; see also Babylonian Talmud, Ketubot 84a.  
204 See Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 6b. 
205 Deuteronomy 6, 18.  
206 Yitzchak Herzog, supra note 202 at 278-79. 
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possible.207  Compassion and mercy are necessary in all aspects of the 
Jewish legal proceedings, including the judgment of litigants and 
criminals and the process leading to the halakhic rulings of rabbis.208 
The essential nature of mercy in the Jewish legal process, as 
well as in the activity of judges in the Rabbinical Courts, is also evident 
in the writings of Rabbi Benzion Chai Ouziel, the Sephardic Chief 
Rabbi of the Land of Israel at the time of Rabbi Herzog, after the period 
of Rabbi Kook: 
In his directive to the public, Rabbi Ouziel stressed that 
adoption of the path of mercy is the desirable manner 
of conduct of Jewish individuals. They should 
implement mercy in their relationships with other 
people, and as a result, the Lord will reward them and 
will be merciful to them, when that is necessary.209 He 
also stressed that all Jews should accord due weight to 
the directive to always act in a merciful manner when 
possible, and fulfill their obligation to act in a manner 
that adopts the ways of the Lord. The Lord is merciful 
and therefore every Jew too should be merciful. Mercy 
is essential in Judaism and Jewish law.210 
He also discussed the proper mode of action of every Jewish 
judge, who acts in the image of the Creator, who is his role model.  His 
directive to the Jewish judge was that he should act in light of the 
guidance of the Sages and be merciful in legal proceedings.211  He 
stressed: 
 
207 See id. 
208 See id. 
209 Rabbi Ouziel and Rabbi Amiel wrote to Jews who lent money and pleaded on 
behalf of those who in difficult financial times could not return the money on time: 
“Behave with mercy in your relationship to other human beings.  This mercy will 
result in the same attitude of the Lord toward us, and there will be a merciful response 
to our requests.”  Rabbi Benzion Meir Chai Ouziel & Rabbi Mosheh Avigdor Amiel, 
An Appeal to Debtor and Creditors to be Merciful to Those who Have Debts, 
MIKHMANEY OUZIEL 466-67 (5769-2009). 
210  See 2 BENZION MEIR CHAI OUZIEL, HEGYONEI OUZIEL 106 (5752-1992) 
[hereinafter: HEGYONEI OUZIEL].  See also id. at 49-50.  “The Bible states: ‘His 
mercies are on all He created.’”  Psalms 145:149; see also Babylonian Talmud, Bava 
Metzia 85a. 
211 See HEGYONEI OUZIEL, supra note 210, at 106. 
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Our Sages, of blessed memory, stated: “Whoever 
judges [in a manner that is an attempt to achieve the 
goal of din emet la-amito becomes a partner of the Holy 
One Blessed be He in the creation of the world.”212 
Jewish law is not like the law of other nations . . . The 
Jewish judges (Dayanim) are the messengers of the 
Lord of justice . . . They derive their basic outlook from 
a higher place. This sublime recognition implants the 
holy dread of G-d in the heart and soul of Jewish 
judges, witnesses and litigants. That leads them to 
proper conduct, of imitating the ways of the Lord of 
judgment in all their actions, and the attempt to achieve 
the goal of Din Emet La-amito.213 
Similarly, according to Rabbi Ouziel, rulings of a Jewish judge 
or rabbi should attempt to act with mercy and rule beyond the strict 
letter of the law.  Jewish judges or rabbis should find out, in each case, 
if the implementation of the merciful outlook is possible.  There is no 
clear-cut rule in the Jewish books dictating how to act in a merciful 
manner in each case, but the general trend should be that these officials 
should always implement their wisdom and prefer the merciful 
decision.214  When a Jewish judge or rabbi adopts the ways of the Lord 
and attributes due weight to his obligation to act in a merciful manner, 
he should attempt to achieve 
absolute justice . . . beyond the strict letter of law, and 
act in the path of the righteous, doing what is good and 
straight according to the perspective of the Lord and 
human beings. The Lord guided us to act in a combined 
manner that promotes justice, law, mercy and truth.215 
Similarly, he wrote that the Jewish judge and the rabbi, in their 
rulings according to the principles of Jewish law, should assume that 
it is very important to act in a merciful manner, and implement in the 
legal sphere. 
 
212 See Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 10a; cf. Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 119b. 
213 2 BEN-ZION MEIR HAI UZIEL, HEGYONEY UZIEL 49-50, 63 (1953 & 1954). 
214  See 3 BEN-ZION MEIR HAI UZIEL, MISHPETEY UZIEL HOSHEN MISHPAT 1 
(Jerusalem, 5760-2000). 
215 See id. 
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Pure kindness.  It is an act of mercy that is the result of 
thought [about the desirable outcome] . . . and this leads 
to the adoption of the policy which is beyond then strict 
letter of law . . . “He is merciful -you also should be 
merciful.  He is gracious- you also should be  gracious.” 
. . . You should create an essence of life, in your internal 
world, and a reality of mercy and pardon, avoid anger, 
and attempt to be holy.  The Lord is merciful in his 
rulings [concerning the fate of human beings], 
pardoning when he judges, pious when he implements 
his power, the Lord of judgment mercy and truth. . . . 
You also should be merciful and gracious, avoid anger, 
and the implementation of mercy and compassion 
should be your dominant choice. . . . [You should be] 
the imitator of the Lord and an individual who desires 
to cling to his ways.216 
 Similarly, he also stressed that the activity of a Jew should be the 
implementation of the directive of the prophet Micah: to “love 
kindness.”217  Rabbi Ouziel stressed, in light of the statement of the 
prophet Micah, that the rules of law and mercy are highly intertwined 
in Jewish law: 
The good way in the eyes of man and G-d is based on 
two principles . . . “to do [justice in] law and to love 
kindness”218. . . performing all of our activities in law 
in the spirit of kindness, love and clemency . . . kindness 
which emerges from the  love of man who was created 
in the Image of the Lord, to raise his consciousness to 
the heights of his goal in life and the understanding of 
his mission . . . Law and love of kindness, combined, 
raise the human being from his troubled lowly life and 
bring him close to the Lord.219 
 Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein, an influential twentieth-century 
rabbi, wrote about the obligation of a Jew to harmonize between the 
rules of Jewish law and the demands of an extralegal morality that are 
 
216 HEGYONEI OUZIEL, supra note 210, at 106. 
217 See Micah 6, 8. 
218 Id. 
219 HEGYONEI OUZIEL, supra note 210, at 105-06. 
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beyond the strict letter of law.220  He stressed that mere implementation 
of the law without an attempt to do what is necessary according to 
Jewish values leads to bad results in Jewish courts.  Therefore, the 
Jewish Sages stated that there is a link between the destruction of the 
Temple and a rigid legal judicial system, which does not apply in 
judicial proceedings along the merciful path, which is “beyond the 
letter of the law.”221 
C. The Development of Jewish Law: From Strict Law 
to Mercy 
Throughout the generations, Jewish law concerning 
punishment has evolved, and there is an evident shift from strict law 
to mercy.  This change in focus initiated the significant degree of 
compassion inherent in the Sages’ interpretations of the biblical texts, 
which has caused the biblical rules to be substantially moderated.  
Favoring merciful interpretation of the rules of Jewish law, rather than 
inflicting severe punishment, is not only evident in the period of the 
ancient Jewish Sages addressing many crimes in biblical law.  It is also 
evident in sources of Jewish law in subsequent generations. 
A particularly prominent example of an interpretation with a 
high degree value in mercy can be found in the Sages’ non-literal 
exegesis of biblical rules pertaining to penalties.  One evident 
illustration of the growing status of compassion in Jewish punishment 
is the Sages’ interpretation of the biblical dictum: “An eye for an 
eye.”222  This is interpreted as mandating monetary punishment, rather 
than the amputation of a limb.  The removal of an organ in the body is 
not necessary, and this penalty is converted to a monetary fine.223 
 
220  See AHARON LICHTENSTEIN, HALAKHAH VEHALKHIM KE’OSHYOT MUSAR: 
HIRHURIM MACHSHAVTIYIM CHINUKHIYIM, ARAKHIM BE-MIVHAN MILHAMAH 13, 
21-24 (Jerusalem, 5743-1983). 
221 See  Concerning the demand to act “beyond the letter of the law.”  Babylonian 
Talmud, Bava Metzia 30b.   In this text, the statement of the Sages is that in the 
generation of the destruction of the Temple, the judges implemented the strict law 
(lit. the law of the Torah-Biblical law) and did not judge according to the principles 
that are lifnim mi-shurat ha-din (“beyond the letter of the law”). 
222 Exodus 21, 24. 
223 See Babylonian Talmud, Ketubot 38a; Bava Kama 83a; 84a; see also Mishneh 
Torah, Hovel Umazik 1:2; Maimonides, Guide for Perplexed, 1:44.  The scholar 
Nisani explained that the gap between biblical law and the law of the Sages in this 
sphere is not significant.  He claims that in biblical law, only in the case of a murderer 
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Conviction for some crimes in the Bible entails the punishment 
of lashes.  The merciful interpretation of the Sages is evident in the 
biblical statement concerning lashes: “Lest your brother be humiliated 
before your eyes.”224  The Sages stated that when courts understand 
that lashes are an inappropriate form of punishment, since it is unduly 
harsh and causes unjustified humiliation of the sinner, they should 
decide to abandon this path.225  Before lashes are administered, the 
court should evaluate the sinner and decide how many lashes the sinner 
can absorb without entailing undesirable involuntary discharges from 
his body, which would cause humiliation or degradation.226  If the 
court sentences an offender to lashes, and the offender who is being 
flogged “soils himself either by urine or feces, he is exempt [from 
further punishment of lashes].”227  Later, in the medieval period, in 
appropriate circumstances, rabbis who acted as Jewish judges adopted 
the path of mercy in their rulings and replaced a severe physical 
punishment with a milder punishment.228 
 
is there no exemption from punishment, but when the crime is less severe, then in 
biblical law too, the removal of a limb is not always necessary, and often, the 
punishment for bodily harm can be converted to a monetary fine.  He claims that 
there was a gap between the theoretical biblical statement, “an eye for an eye,” and 
the reality that, in many cases, enabled implementation of the option to convert the 
damage to the eye to a fine.  See David Nisani, “Eye for an eye” - An eye or a 
monetary fine?  On the Status of the Victim in Jewish Criminal Law, 347 WKLY. 
PORTION SHEETS, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF JUST., JEWISH L. DIV., 347 EMOR WKLY. 
PORTION (5769-2009). 
224  Deuteronomy 25, 3; see Responsa of Rashba 5:130-131; see also Responsa of 
Rashba 5:239 (concerning the principle that we should avoid the outcome: “Lest your 
brother be humiliated before your eyes.”). 
225 See Rashi on Makkot 22b, s.v. nitkalkel. 
226 See Mishnah Makkot 3:11. 
227 Mishnah Makkot 3:14. 
228 See the responsum of the fourteenth century Jewish scholar in Spain and North 
Africa.  See, e.g., Responsa of Rabbi Yitzhak Ben, Sheshet Barafat (Ribash) 281.  In 
this responsum, he wrote that, at first glance, the punishment of an offender should 
be lashes.  However, since there are mitigating circumstances, it is preferable not to 
act in a manner involving total humiliation of the sinner.  Therefore, his conclusion 
was that in order to avoid unnecessary shaming of the offender, the appropriate 
punishment is to “secretly, and in a modest manner, perform the punishment in the 
presence of three or four individuals, and not more than ten individuals, and this 
punishment [of lashes] may be mitigated.”  Mercy is an evident factor in another 
responsum.  In an attempt to avoid unnecessary shaming, he raises the possibility of 
replacing a physical punishment with a punishment that is less severe.  See Responsa 
of Ribash 432.  In yet another responsum, he took into consideration mitigating 
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The shift to mercy in line with the Sages’ interpretation of 
biblical law, is especially apparent in ancient sources pertaining to 
capital punishment.  The death penalty is common in the Bible.229  
Later, however, there has been a substantial moderation of the rules in 
the literature of the Sages pertaining to the death penalty; these 
changes instituted a de facto abolition of the death penalty, probably 
in order to avoid the irreversible outcome of the execution of innocent 
individuals as a result of false convictions.  The Sanhedrin was defined 
as “murderous” if it killed criminals once in seven230 or in seventy 
years.231  Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiba go so far as to determine: 
“Had we been members of the Sanhedrin, no one would have ever been 
executed.”232  In accordance with this statement, an ancient text states 
that “[f]orty years before the destruction of the [Second] Temple, the 
Sanhedrin was exiled and settled in the storefront.”233  According to 
this tradition, capital punishment was abolished de facto when the 
Sanhedrin was moved to another place in Jerusalem since capital 
offenses could no longer be adjudicated anywhere after the 
 
circumstances and ruled that the severe punishment, that was appropriate in other 
circumstances would be replaced by a fine.  See Responsa of Ribash 352.  Mercy 
was also evident when medieval Ashkenazic rabbis vacated a verdict of lashes due 
to concern about excessive punishment.  See Hagahot Maimoniyot, Sanhedrin 17:1.  
Rabbi Jacob Weil, the fifteenth century rabbi of Franco-German Jewry also 
suggested the possibility of fines replacing the regular, physical punishment.  See 
Responsa of Mahari Weil 147.  In the sixteenth century, Rabbi Moses Isserlis, in his 
codification of Jewish law of Ashkenazi medieval Jewry, stated the rule that four 
gold coins may replace the punishment of lashes.  See Hagahot Ha-Rema, Hoshen 
Mishpat 2:1. 
229 In biblical law, the death penalty is the punishment for several deliberate crimes.  
These include blasphemy, cursing parents, striking parents, idolatry, false prophecy 
in the name of idolatry, missionizing individuals to be idol worshipers, desecration 
of the Sabbath, witchcraft and sorcery, several types of prohibited sexual relations, 
adultery involving an engaged women or the daughter of a priest, a rebellious son, 
kidnapping and sale of the kidnapped Jew, murder, a rebellious elder, and false 
scheming witnesses who seek to kill another human being as a result of their 
testimony. 
230 See Mishnah Makot 1:10. 
231 See id. (discussing the view of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya). 
232 Id.  This is the view of Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiba, but Rabban Shimon ben 
Gamliel remarks there: “They increase shedders of blood in Israel.”  Id. 
233  Babylonian Talmud, Avoda Zara 8b; see Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 41a.  
Rashi explained that after the removal of the Sanhedrin from its original location –
”Lishkat hagazit” – near the Temple to another location in Jerusalem –”the 
storefront” – it did not retain the authority to impose the death penalty.  Id. 
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Sanhedrin’s dislocation – “lishkat hagazit” – from its original location 
near the Temple. 
Moreover, even when capital punishment was in force, there 
were a number of rules in ancient Jewish law, during the Tannaitic and 
Amoraic periods, that were designed to prevent courts from issuing 
capital punishment to the greatest extent possible.  Consequently, the 
implementation of capital punishment in the period of their activity 
was uncommon. 
Jewish judges first had to warn the witnesses in capital 
punishment cases to set before their eyes the value of human life of the 
accused human being, who was created in the image of G-d, and think 
about his fate if he were to be convicted.234  After this warning, the 
witnesses knew they must be careful, as they may cause irreversible 
damage to the innocent.  The judges also added another essential 
element in this warning to the witnesses to ensure that their testimony 
would be fully accurate and to prevent the conviction and execution of 
innocent Jews: an explanation of the very detailed cross-examination 
process of witnesses in capital punishment.235  Judges warned 
witnesses that the court will subject them to this interrogation and 
cross-examination.  He will ask them identical questions and compare 
their answers in order to ensure, before a conviction, that the testimony 
is true.236  This type of cross-examination exposes potentially false 
testimonies and any significant discrepancy in the testimony 
invalidates the witness’s credibility.237 
Another remarkable element in capital punishment cases is the 
requirement to warn the person about to commit a qualifying offence 
that, if he does so, his conviction may entail the death penalty.  Two 
qualified witnesses must warn the possible offender that he is about to 
commit an offense, and the offender must verbally acknowledge, 
before acting, that he is aware that his possible criminal activity does 
not comport with the rules of Jewish law mentioned in this warning, 
and commit the criminal act immediately thereafter.238  
 
234  See Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:5 (discussing the intimidating speech given to the 
witnesses). 
235 See id. 
236 See id.  
237 See Mishnah Sanhedrin 5:1-3. 
238 See Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 40b-41a; Mishneh Torah, Sanhedrin 12:2; see 
also Mishnah Sanhedrin 10:4; see also Rashi on Sanhedrin 111b s.v. utzerikhim.  
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Other special requirements for capital punishment cases 
include a judicial panel of twenty-three judges,239 and when there is a 
conviction in capital punishment cases, there must be at least two more 
judges voting to convict than to acquit.240  Additionally, in capital 
punishment cases, a verdict that is not merciful to convict should be 
issued one day after the closing of proceedings in court and not on the 
same day.241  This delay  enables the judges to grant due weight to the 
option of adoption of a merciful outlook. 
 
239  See Mishnah, Sanhedrin 4:1 (“What is the difference between civil monetary 
cases and capital punishment cases?  Civil cases [are tried] by three [judges], but 
capital punishment cases [are tried] by twenty-three.  The arguments of the judges in 
Civil cases may be opened [by arguments] either for acquittal or conviction, while 
in capital punishment cases, charges must be opened [by arguments] for acquittal but 
may not be opened [by arguments] for conviction.  Civil monetary cases may be 
decided by a majority of one, either for acquittal or conviction; whereas capital 
punishment charges are decided by a majority of one for acquittal, but [at least] a 
majority of two for conviction.  Decisions regarding civil monetary cases may be 
reversed both for acquittal and for conviction; while decisions regarding capital 
punishment charges may be reversed for acquittal only but not for conviction.  
Regarding civil monetary cases, all [including the rabbinic students, observing the 
activity of the Jewish court in this case] may argue for or against the defendant.  
Regarding capital punishment charges, anyone [including observing students], may 
argue in favor of the accused but not against him.  Regarding civil monetary cases, 
he who has argued for conviction, may [change his mind and] argue for acquittal, 
and he who has argued for acquittal, may argue for conviction; whereas, in capital 
punishment charges, one who has argued for conviction may subsequently argue for 
acquittal, but one who has argued for acquittal may not argue for conviction.  [One 
verse states: “And they shall judge the people at all times,” (Exodus 18, 22) thus, 
implying that judgement may take place both during daytime and nighttime, another 
verse states: “Then it will be on the day that he bequeaths,” (Deuteronomy 21, 16) 
thus, limiting judgment to daytime? [Rather], civil monetary cases are tried by day 
[meaning that the trial must be initiated by day], but [they may continue into, and be] 
concluded, with a ruling, at night.  However, [regarding capital punishment charges 
the verse states: “Hang them before the sun,” (Numbers 25, 4) indicating that] capital 
charges must be tried by day and be concluded by day.  Civil monetary cases can be 
concluded on the same day, whether for acquittal or conviction; but capital 
punishment charges may be concluded on the same day for acquittal but only on the 
next day for conviction.  Therefore, [capital punishment] trials are not held on Friday 
or on the eve of a Festival [since if the verdict is guilty, it must be postponed till the 
next day and death sentences may not be executed on Shabbat or on a Festival.  
Delaying the execution until Sunday is considered cruel and is not an option].”). 
240 See id. 
241 See id. 
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These requirements do not exist in relation to the activity of the 
Jewish court in monetary matters.242  In monetary cases, the judicial 
panel consists of three judges.243  The decision is issued on a simple 
majority of the panel judges.244  Finally, the decision, whether in favor 
of or against a litigant, is issued on the same day, after the end of the 
proceedings in court.245 
Another restriction on convictions in capital punishment cases 
stems from the obligation to judge defendants in all criminal cases as 
favorably as possible.  This policy is part of a general Jewish trend to 
fortify the rights of the accused in Jewish criminal proceedings as 
much as possible and protect him or her from irreversible mistakes in 
the verdict.  If a Jewish court does not judge the defendant in all 
criminal cases, especially in capital punishment cases, as favorably as 
possible, and does not ensure that criminal proceedings are conducted 
in a mild and balanced manner, the unfortunate consequences could be 
false convictions and severe punishment of innocent people. 
According to the Sages’ interpretation of biblical law, there is an 
imperative in Jewish law to judge defendants, in all criminal cases, as 
favorably as possible.246  In a situation of uncertainty, the 
interpretation of the Jewish individual and Jewish court regarding the 
actions of other Jews should be kind and merciful.247  When there is 
uncertainty, the court can interpret the facts and situation and reach the 
unfavorable conclusion that a Jew committed a crime.  It could also 
interpret the same facts and situation and reach the favorable 
conclusion that he did not commit an offense.  When there is a 
reasonable doubt in criminal cases, the court must adopt the path of 
mercy and not convict the suspect.  This is a clear and evident rule also 
in the interpretation of medieval Jewish scholars of Jewish law in 
Tannaitic and Amoraic sources.248 
 
242 See id. 
243 See id. 
244 See id. 
245 See id. 
246 The Bible requires a Jew who judges or evaluates the activity of another Jew to 
act in a just manner.  See Leviticus 19, 15.  
247 The Sages interpreted this obligation in the Bible as follows: every Jew should 
evaluate the activity of his fellow Jew in a manner that is favorable, insofar as 
possible.  See the statement of Rabbi Joshua ben Perachiah, in Mishnah Avot 1:6.  
See also Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 127b. 
248 In medieval Jewish literature, the common interpretation concerning the desirable 
policy was that when an individual evaluates the activity of another individual, and 
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In capital punishment cases, the court has a special obligation 
to consider whether a favorable interpretation is possible in light of the 
circumstances of the case.  This obligation is designed to prevent 
unjustified convictions and executions.  The court should determine if 
a verdict in favor of the suspect is possible.  In these cases, the court 
should allow the presentation of any legal claim of any person, or any 
evidence, acting in favor of the defendant, that could lead to the 
conclusion that the suspect did not commit the crime.249  The Mishnah 
states: 
After this (the cross- examination of the first witness in 
capital punishment cases), the second [witness] is 
admitted and [also] examined.  If his testimonies 
correspond, they (the judges) open [the proceedings 
with arguments] in favor [of the accused].  If one of the 
witnesses says: “I have something to say in his favor”; 
 
there is uncertainty since it is not clear if he acted in the appropriate or inappropriate 
manner, he is obligated to be kind and merciful in his judgment of the activity of 
another human being, if the circumstances enable this interpretation.  See Rashi on 
Shevuot 30a, s.v. hevey dan et chaverkh lekhaf zekhut; MAIMONIDES, COMMENTARY 
TO THE MISHNAH ch. Avot at 1, 6 (Joseph Kapach ed., Jerusalem 5725-1965), and a 
similar interpretation of the rule in the ancient texts of the Sages.  RABBI MENACHEM 
BEN SHLOMO (HAMEIRI), CHIBUR HATESHUVAH 85-86 (Jerusalem, 5736-1976).  
With clear words, he determines the essence of the Jewish rules. He wrote that the 
interpretation of the obligation to judge other Jews in a just manner is as follows: “A 
man should always judge the actions of his fellow man in a favorable manner.  When 
his actions can be interpreted in two opposing ways, and there is no clear-cut 
conclusion, and he could be pious a criminal, there is an obligation to adopt the 
favorable conclusion.”  BEIT HABEHIRAH, SHEVUOT 30a (Jerusalem, 5721-1961), 
s.v. af al pi sherov devarim.  He explains that this path of mercy leads to the true 
outcome.  The favorable attitude is required when there are doubts, and there is no 
clear cut conclusion that a person committed a crime.  See HIBBUR HATESHUVAH, 
MESHIV NEFESH art. 1, 4 at 90 (Jerusalem, 5736-1976). 
249 See Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1; Mishneh Torah, Sanhedrin 11:2.  In these texts the 
obligation of the court to judge in a favorable manner is applicable in capital 
punishment cases but not in disputes concerning monetary civil matters.  These rules 
are not applicable in monetary civil matters since in monetary matters, a court rules 
concerning claims of two litigants, on both sides of the barricade.  In monetary 
disputes, one party will feel the that decision was unjust when there was “mercy” 
that led to a “lenient” decision regarding the other party.  However, in criminal cases, 
society is the “other party” that is accusing the suspect.  Therefore, it is possible and 
necessary to implement mercy in criminal cases and adopt favorable outlook 
regarding the suspect, when this approach is possible. 
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or one of the rabbinic students250 says: “I have an 
argument against him,” he is silenced. But if one of the 
rabbinic students says: “I have an argument in his 
favor,” he is brought up and seated with them, and does 
not descend from there all that day.251 If there is 
substance to his argument, he is heard [and does not 
descend from there]. And even if he [the accused] 
himself says: “I can present an argument for my 
acquittal,” he is heard, provided that there is substance 
to his statement.  If they find him not guilty, he is 
acquitted; if not, they postpone the verdict until the 
following day.  They (the judges) pair off, practicing 
moderation in food and abstaining totally from wine the 
entire day, and they (each pair) discuss the case [the rest 
of the day and] throughout the night.  Early the next 
morning, they assemble in court.  He who favors 
acquittal states: “I declared him innocent [yesterday] 
and stand by my opinion.” While he who argued in 
favor of conviction states: “I declared him guilty and 
stand by my opinion.”  One who [previously] argued 
for conviction may now argue for acquittal, but one 
who [previously] argued for acquittal, may not reverse 
himself and argue for conviction.252 
As mentioned above, there are also many other rules in the 
Mishnah that are in favor of the accused in capital punishment cases.253  
According to one of these rules, civil monetary cases can be concluded 
on the same day, whether for acquittal or conviction.254  However, 
capital punishment charges may be concluded on the same day for 
acquittal, but only on the next day for conviction.255  In the Babylonian 
Talmud, Rabbi Kahana added: 
 
250 See Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:3-4. 
251 Even if there is no substance to his argument.  If he would be forced to descend, 
this would embarrass him and discourage finding arguments in favor of the 
defendant. 
252  Mishnah Sanhedrin 5:4-5; see also Tosefta Sanhedrin 9:2 (concerning the 
presentation of arguments in favor of the accused in capital punishment cases). 
253 See Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1. 
254 See id. 
255 See id. 
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If the Sanhedrin unanimously find the accused guilty, 
he is acquitted. Why? Jewish law requires that the 
sentence in this case must be postponed until the next 
day, in order to allow the judges to think about the 
details of the case, and maybe they will conclude that 
the favorable outlook [of acquittal] is dominant.256 
When the outlook that leads to acquittal is not presented in the panel 
of judges, it cannot be anticipated that on the next day, the necessary 
majority of judges, in a Jewish court that conducts proceedings in 
capital punishment matters, will arrive at the conclusion that the 
favorable outlook prevails, and that therefore, the accused should be 
acquitted.  Additionally, at least one judge should present arguments 
in favor of the suspect.  When the life of a person is in danger, if all 
the judges present their opinions only in the severe, convicting point 
of view, the conviction is not valid and capital punishment is not 
possible.257  If all judges convict, the more favorable outlook does not 
give due weight in the process leading to the decision.  In these 
circumstances, this panel of judges might be biased against the accused 
and will not be able to properly evaluate all the relevant factors in favor 
 
256 Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 17a; see also Rashi on Sanhedrin 17a, s.v. keyvan 
degmireih (“If the judges did not arrive at the favorable conclusion at the first day 
[after the end of the trial], they should wait and rule about this case on the next day, 
in order that during this delay they will find reasons to rule in favor of the accused.”); 
see also Rabbi Meir Halevi Abulafia, Commentary, Yad Ramah al Masechet 
Sanhedrin, pt. Saloniki at 17a (5558-1798), s.v. amar Rav Kahanah (“[I]f the judges 
could not rule in favor of the accused on the first day they should wait until the next 
day, so  that maybe the next day one of those who wanted to convict will change his 
mind and adopt the point of view of those who wanted to rule in favor of the 
accused.”). 
257 Rabbi Yehudah Loew Ben Bezalel, known as the Maharal of Prague, explained 
that when all the judges in capital punishment cases can see only the point of view 
militating for conviction, their decision is invalid since there is an obligation to 
examine the favorable option, and it is not in order that all members of a court to 
adopt only the severe approach to convict.  RABBI YEHUDAH LOEW BEN BEZALEL, 
NETZACH YISRAEL ch. 13 at 76-77 (Jerusalem, 5732-1972).  Rabbi Eliyahu Desler 
explained that according to the Jewish view, investigation of whether the favorable 
option is possible in a particular case is essential for a court that attempts to reach 
the true conclusion.  RABBI ELIYAHU DESLER, MIKHTAV MIELIYAHU 87-88 
(Jerusalem, 5743-1983).  Therefore, in the appropriate circumstances, the Lord 
intervenes and guides the Jewish judges to adopt the path of the merciful verdict, in 
favor of the accused in capital punishment cases, in order that their legal decision 
will be the “ultimate truth.”  Id. 
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of the accused.258  Therefore, in these circumstances, the court’s 
decision to convict and pronounce a death sentence is invalid, and the 
ruling must be an acquittal.259 
In addition, Jewish judges who hate or love a particular litigant 
are disqualified.  Hatred causes an emotional “distance” from the 
litigant; as a result, the judge cannot consider all the aspects in his 
 
258 See RABBI YEHUDAH LOEW BEN BEZALEL, BAER HAGOLAH, HABAER HASHENI 
26-27 (Jerusalem, 5732-1972).  Rabbi Kahana stated:  
If the Sanhedrin unanimously find the accused guilty - he is acquitted'.  
Why?  Since Jewish law requires that the sentence in this case be 
postponed until the next day, in order that the judges think the details of 
the case, and maybe they will conclude that the favorable outlook [of 
acquittal], prevails.” . . . But, in these circumstances, these judges will not 
be able to find out what are the favorable aspects in the future. . . . The 
decision to acquit him will be a strange conclusion for them, after all the 
judges ruled he should be convicted.  Therefore, in these circumstances, 
the decision should be an acquittal. . . . Judges are human beings and 
therefore there is a requirement that when they wish to convict, they 
should wait until the next day, in capital punishment cases where an 
execution by mistake is irreversible. . . . When judges see that one judge, 
or several judges, are in favor of the accused, they might change their 
minds, but when they see that all judges agree to convict, they feel this is 
the final decision and do not attempt, in the required manner, to 
investigate if there are relevant factors in favor of the accused.  They do 
not devote the necessary intellectual effort and attempt to find out if there 
are these factors, in favor of the accused. 
Id. 
259 See the explanation of Maimonides in Mishneh Torah, Sanhedrin 9:1: 
When all the judges in the Sanhedrin begin with the conclusion that their 
judgment of a case involving capital punishment, should be that the 
accused is liable, he is acquitted.  There must be at least one judge who 
seeks to acquit him and raises claims in the panel of judges on his behalf, 
and in these circumstances, he can be convicted, if the majority holds him 
liable.  Only in these circumstances can he be executed.  
Id.  A similar explanation appears in Rabbi Menachem ben Shelomo Hameiri’s 
fourteenth century commentary on the Talmud:  
When all the judges in the Sanhedrin, in capital punishment cases, begin 
with the conclusion that the accused is liable, this does not lead to the 
imposition of the death penalty, since the law requires that in capital 
punishment cases the decision will be made on the next day if they did not 
decide to acquit on the first day, in order to enable the judges to think of 
reasons that may lead to a ruling in favor of the accused.  But all the judges 
begin with the conclusion that the accused is liable, they will not be able 
to find in the future reasons in favor of the accused that can lead to 
acquittal.  In these circumstances, the accused is not sentenced to death 
until there are judges who change their minds and rule in favor of the 
accused, although the majority of judges decided to convict him. 
Beit Habehirah Sanhedrin 17a, s.v. Sanhedrin shepatchu. 
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favor.260  Meanwhile, love causes a “friendly inclination” of emotional 
closeness with the litigant, and the judge might therefore grant 
unnecessary weight to aspects favoring the litigant.261  Rabbi Papa 
stated: 
A man should not act as judge either for one whom he 
loves or for one whom he hates; for no man can see all 
the elements that could lead to the determination of the 
guilt of whom he loves or all the favorable factors that 
could lead to the acquittal of one whom he hates.262 
Maimonides defines the scope of “love” and “hatred” in this 
context: 
A judge may not adjudicate the case of a friend. This 
applies even if the person is not a member of his 
wedding party or one of his more intimate 
companions.263 Similarly, he may not adjudicate the 
case of one he hates. This applies even if the person is 
not his enemy and one whose misfortune he seeks.264 
Instead, the two litigants must be looked upon equally 
in the eyes and in the hearts of the judges. If the judge 
 
260 See Rashi on Sanhedrin 29a, s.v. chad ledayan. 
261 See Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 29a. 
262 Babylonian Talmud, Ketubot 105b. 
263 The definition of the scope of “love” in the writings of Maimonides is wider than 
the narrow scope in the example in the Mishnah Sanhedrin 3:5: “A friend or an 
enemy [is disqualified].  ‘A friend’ [means] one’s best man [during the period of his 
friend’s wedding].”  Mishnah Sanhedrin 3:5; see Mishnah Bava Batra 9:4; see also 
Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 29a (“By ‘friend’ one’s groomsman is meant.  How 
long [is he regarded as a groomsman]? -Rabbi Abba stated, in Rabbi Jeremiah’s 
name: ‘The whole period of seven days of marriage feast.’  The Rabbis stated, in the 
name of Rav: ‘After the first day [he no longer is regarded as such].)’”  The 
Tosaphists claimed that the basic law only disqualifies one’s groomsman and in other 
cases, included in the definition of “love” in Maimonides, the disqualification is only 
a stringency, beyond what is required by law.  Tosaphot Ketubot, 105b, s.v. Lo. 
264 The scope of “hatred” in the writings of Maimonides is wider than the narrow 
scope in the example, concerning the disqualification of a witness as a result of 
hatred.  Mishnah Sanhedrin 3:5.  ‘“An enemy’ [means] any man who is not on 
speaking terms with this person for three days.”  Id. 
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does not know either of them and is not familiar with 
their deeds, this is the fairest judgment that could be.265 
Some medieval Jewish scholars stressed that this rule is necessary in 
order to achieve the objective of Jewish rulings - din emet la’amito.266  
It ensures that the decision of a Jewish court or rabbi is not tainted as 
a result of bias.  The court or rabbi should act in a completely neutral 
manner. Since absolute impartiality is essential to decision-making, 
Jewish judges and rabbis should not reach decisions as a result of their 
love or hatred of parties whose requests or actions are being evaluated 
by their decisions.  Sometimes, a harsh or mild verdict is the result of 
strong negative or positive feelings toward an individual; however, this 
will be avoided when we ensure that a decision of a rabbi or Jewish 
court will not be tainted as a result of bias.267 
The Sages also applied to capital punishment law the 
commandment in the Bible, “Love your fellow as yourself,”268 which 
Rabbi Akiba defines as “a great rule of the Torah (biblical Jewish 
law).”269  In light of this commandment, the ancient Sages wrote that 
a capital sentence must be executed in the least cruel and humiliating 
way, limiting the pain and indignity of the individual sentenced to the 
death penalty: “Choose him a fine death.”270  Therefore, capital 
punishment must not be administered in a prolonged manner; rather, 
 
265 Mishneh Torah, Sanhedrin 23:6; see also RABBI YITZCHAK ABUHAV MENORAT 
HAMAOR ch.17 (“Love of Friends”) (Vilnius 1883) Rabbi Abuhav stressed that one 
of the more important characteristics of love of friends is the activity of favorable 
judgment of what other human beings do.  This behavior prevents unnecessary 
disputes between human beings and is the foundation of peaceful relationships 
between individuals.  He stressed that there are several good outcomes of this 
behavior.  One important result of this good behavior is love and unity between 
friends.  Id. at 309-10. 
266 Rabbi Joseph Karo stresses that the attempt to reach the goal of din emet la-amito 
requires that the Jewish judge act with absolute impartiality.  Rabbi Joseph Karo, 
Commentary, Beit Yosef, Hoshen Mishpat 1, s.v. ve-zehu . . . kol ha-dan din emet 
le-amitto. 
267  See 2 ELIAV SHOCHETMAN, SEDER HADIN BEBEYT HADIN HARABANI 574-76 
(5771-2011) (concerning the rules in Jewish law that were enacted in order to prevent 
bias in legal proceedings in Jewish law). 
268 Leviticus 19, 18. 
269 See Genesis Rabba 24:7; Jerusalem Talmud, Nedarim 9:4; Babylonian Talmud, 
Shabbat 31a. 
270 See Babylonian Talmud, Pesahim 75a, Ketubot 37b, Sanhedrin 45a, Sanhedrin 
52b; see also Rashi on Sanhedrin 45a, s.v. mita yafa. 
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the execution should be quick, in order to reduce the suffering of the 
executed human being as much as possible.271 
Rabbi Tzvi Hirsch Chayut explained that the principle 
concerning “fine death” expresses a general rule in Jewish law of the 
ancient Sages.  Jewish law will never impose an obligation or 
punishment that may result in severe and negative effects upon a 
Jewish individual.  The rule “love your fellow as yourself” is 
applicable in the sphere of capital punishment to ensure that the death 
penalty should be a “fine death.”  When the Sages had doubts as to the 
appropriateness of a punishment, they acted in light of this general 
rule.  In turn, the Sages’ actions guided the Jewish court, in all aspects 
of its activity, to implement the lenient and less severe punishment.  
This is due to the general dominant goal of Jewish law: implementation 
of “compassion and mercy” in all the activities of Jews in the world.272 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
According to many Jewish sources that present the point of 
view of influential rabbis and Jewish scholars, certain considerations 
that can lead to severe sentences – including the need to combat crime, 
deter potential criminals, and ensure that convicted criminals do not 
commit additional crimes – are only part of the wide range of 
important considerations in the Jewish legal system.  These should 
include the significant weight accorded in a Jewish court to mitigating 
circumstances and the desire to adopt the path of mercy of the Lord.  
The ultimate truth in the legal system can be achieved only when the 
important perspective of a merciful approach exercised through 
compassion, which is implemented by the Creator of the World, is 
given its due consideration and leads the court to aspire to act beyond 
the strict letter of law. 
Therefore, it is fitting that Jewish courts and rabbis, before 
making their decisions, should engage in an in-depth consideration of 
whether the harsh or the merciful outcomes is possible and desirable.  
This determination of what is the “ideal” in Jewish law (i.e., beyond 
the letter of law) is the legal policy that is necessary to undertake in 
the decisions of a Jewish court or in the halakhic decisions of a rabbi.  
In Judaism, mercy is not only the process of matching the sentence of 
 
271 See Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 45a. 
272 See ZVI HIRSCH CHAYUT, MEVO HATALMUD ch. 16 at 36 (Lemberg, 5688-1928). 
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an individual to the particular context of his or her act.  The Jewish 
judge should take a deliberate approach, employing his intellect and 
emotions, on the path leading toward a merciful ruling, insofar as 
possible.  He should analyze all the ramifications of his decisions and 
strike a suitable balance between different, and sometimes conflicting, 
relevant facts, outlooks and values, in order to reach the ultimate truth.  
This decision-making process is more appropriate and reflects greater 
moral integrity of the legal process and judgment than the current 
process in American law.  The alternative process, involving a cold 
and distanced evaluation of facts and circumstances, lacks this 
necessary moral inspiration embraced by the Jewish law system.  The 
guidelines for the Jewish judge are that he must exercise moderation 
in the legal process and focus on trying to prevent the suffering of 
innocent individuals.  He should ensure that he is not denying the rights 
and defense of litigants, who should be granted proper rights and 
adequate legal defense, and is not punishing offenders in a strict, 
unjustified manner that is not necessary in light of all the relevant 
circumstances.  This pattern of activity is clearly the embodiment of 
mercy in the legal system. 
Acting in a lenient manner towards the offender, beyond the 
strict letter of the law, is indeed a challenge to the rule of law and leads, 
conceptually, to disorder and chaos.  However, the appropriate 
combination of mercy and law, in cases where this integration is 
necessary and desirable, should lead to the desirable goal: a just and 
equitable legal process.  According to the Jewish outlook, a court 
verdict that broadcasts a message of compassion, consideration, and 
conciliation may be essential for the existence of normal society more 
than a verdict which expresses an attitude of “let the law cut through 
the mountain.”273  Mercy in courts and relationships between human 
beings are important.  The outcome of the implementation of the 
merciful perspective is a good relationship among human beings.  
They live in harmony and peace in a world that can “survive.”274  
Therefore the Jewish judge is required to employ his ethics and 
conscience and seek to go beyond the laws and rules dictated by the 
strict letter of the law. 
This focus in Jewish law and Jewish thought upon the desire to 
act in a merciful manner can be a source for comparison and 
 
273 See supra note 106 and accompanying text (concerning this outlook). 
274 See supra note 125. 
63
Kaplan: Mercy in American Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center,
1256 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 37 
inspiration in criminal law in modern legal systems, such as the 
American legal system.  It is relevant in many aspects of criminal law, 
including the nomination of judges and juries, legal policy regarding 
criminal judgment, and decisions issuing often very severe criminal 
punishment that involve capital punishment and three-strikes law 
convictions. 
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